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Patent holdup has proven one of the most controversial topics in innovation policy,
in part because companies with a vested interest in denying its existence have spent
tens of millions of dollars trying to debunk it. Notwithstanding a barrage of political
and academic attacks, both the general theory of holdup and its practical application
in patent law remain valid and pose significant concerns for patent policy. Patent and
antitrust law have made significant strides in the past fifteen years in limiting the
problem of patent holdup. But those advances are currently under threat from the
Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice, which has reversed prior policies and
broken with the Federal Trade Commission to downplay the significance of patent
holdup while undermining private efforts to prevent it. Ironically, the effect of the
Antitrust Division’s actions is to create a greater role for antitrust law in stopping
patent holdup. We offer some suggestions for moving in the right direction.
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INTRODUCTION
Patent holdup occurs when a patent holder is able to obtain unreasonably
high royalties by asserting its patent against another company’s products
because that company’s most eﬃcient way to develop, make, and sell those
target products involves investments that cannot easily be redeployed to noninfringing products.1 The owner of a valid patent that is essential to making
devices that comply with a popular telecommunications standard would wield
enormous monopoly power if it could block device manufacturers from
See FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT NOTICE
REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION 191 (2011), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/ﬁles/documents/
reports/evolving-ip-marketplace-aligning-patent-notice-and-remedies-competition-report-federaltrade/110307patentreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/EG7V-NNAL] (“The ability of patentees to demand and
obtain royalty payments based on the switching costs faced by accused infringers, rather than the ex ante
value of the patented technology compared to alternatives, is commonly called ‘hold-up.’”). In the context
of standard-setting, the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission have defined holdup as
“the ability of an intellectual property holder to extract more favorable licensing terms after a standard is
set.” U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY
RIGHTS:
PROMOTING
INNOVATION
AND
COMPETITION
5
(2007),
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2007/07/11/222655.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y97Y-KNM5].
1
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selling products that comply with that standard. The elevated royalty rates
that would result from such unconstrained monopoly power would be passed
through to device prices, causing substantial consumer harm. These problems
would be magniﬁed because there are thousands of Standard-Essential
Patents (“SEPs”) reading on modern telecommunications standards, and each
SEP owner could demand a monopoly price to permit use of the standard.
We address the proper role of antitrust in this setting. While many holdup
problems can be solved without antitrust law, antitrust has a role to play in
policing holdup, particularly in cases where the patent owner avoids its
contractual commitments or uses a SEP to restrict competition in adjacent
markets. The very forces in the federal government that currently oppose
antitrust intervention also oppose using patent or contract law to enforce
commitments to license patents on Fair Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory
(“FRAND”) terms. They have done so in part by denying the very existence
of the problem. Ironically, their eﬀorts may make antitrust intervention more,
not less, important.
The problem of patent holdup is a special instance of the general problem
of holdup that has been studied extensively in the literature on transaction
cost economics.2 Opportunism by ﬁrms generally discourages investments
that are subject to holdup. As a special case of that general principle, patent
holdup retards innovation. With more than 300,000 utility patents issued
each year by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Oﬃce (“PTO”),3 preventing
patent holdup is critical to promoting economic growth, especially in
industries experiencing rapid technological progress, where patent holdup
can act as a headwind slowing down innovation.
Considerable progress to address the problem of patent holdup was made
from 2006 to 2016:
• The Supreme Court’s 2006 eBay decision greatly reduced the threat
of patent holdup by limiting the availability of injunctions to patent
holders, particularly those patent holders whose only legitimate
interest was in collecting a reasonable licensing fee.4
• The Federal Circuit cracked down on junk science in patent damages
in a series of decisions. These decisions rejected the “25 percent rule
2 “This type of hold up is a variant of the classical ‘hold-up problem.’” Id. at 35 n.11. See infra
Section I for further discussion.
3 U.S.
Patent
Activity
Calendar
Years
1790
to
the
Present,
USPTO,
https://www.uspto.gov/web/oﬃces/ac/ido/oeip/taf/h_counts.htm [https://perma.cc/MA3K-FV92]
(last visited Apr. 10, 2020).
4 See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 392-93 (2006) (rejecting the rule that
injunctions are automatic on a ﬁnding of infringement); id. at 396-97 (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(“[L]egal damages may well be suﬃcient to compensate for the infringement [of patents used
primarily for obtaining licensing fees] and an injunction may not serve the public interest.”).
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of thumb.”5 They require courts in complex product cases to
apportion damages, awarding the patentee damages only for the
value their invention contributed and preventing them from using
an inﬂated claim over the entire product to hold up the
manufacturer.6 They also empower district courts to vet and reject
untested economic theories before trial in a Daubert proceeding.7
The Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit made it easier for
defendants to recover their attorneys’ fees in frivolous cases,8
signiﬁcantly reducing the proﬁtability of “bottom-feeder” patent
trolls that relied on the cost of litigation as the basis of holdup.9
The United States Trade Representative in 2013 vetoed an exclusion
order awarded by the International Trade Commission (ITC) related
to a Samsung SEP infringed by certain Apple smartphones and
tablets, explicitly expressing concerns about patent hold-up.10
The Federal Circuit’s 2014 decision in Ericsson v. D-Link Systems, Inc.
established, in the context of SEPs where a patent owner has
promised to license on FRAND terms, that “reasonable royalties”
should reﬂect the incremental value of the patented invention prior
to its inclusion in an industry standard and not the value associated
with standardization.11
The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in 2015
substantially clariﬁed and strengthened the FRAND commitments
it requires of participants, limiting the circumstances under which
SEP holders could seek injunctions and clarifying the meaning of

5 See Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (holding that
“the 25 percent rule of thumb is . . . fundamentally ﬂawed”).
6 See Finjan, Inc. v Blue Coat Sys., Inc., 879 F.3d 1299, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“When the
accused technology does not make up the whole of the accused product, apportionment is
required.”); Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc., 773 F.3d 1201, 1226 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“[T]he ultimate
reasonable royalty award must be based on the incremental value that the patented invention adds
to the end product.”); Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, 580 F.3d 1301, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (rejecting
a damages calculation that used an inﬂated royalty rate).
7 See Uniloc, 632 F.3d at 1306 (“Under Daubert, the District Court must exercise its ‘gatekeeper’
function in ensuring that scientiﬁc testimony is relevant and reliable.”).
8 See Octane Fitness, LLC v. Icon Health & Fitness, Inc., 572 U.S. 545, 557 (2014) (rejecting the
“Federal Circuit’s requirement that patent litigants establish their entitlement to fees under § 285 by
‘clear and convincing evidence’”); Adjustacam, LLC v. Newegg, Inc., 861 F.3d 1353, 1361 (Fed. Cir.
2017) (awarding attorney’s fees to the defendant under § 285 as a result of “dubious behavior” by the
plaintiff). As a disclosure, one of us (Lemley) represented defendant Newegg in that case.
9 For a discussion of this problem, see Mark A. Lemley & A. Douglas Melamed, Missing the
Forest for the Trolls, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 2117, 2126, 2167 (2013).
10 See Letter from Michael B. G. Froman, Ambassador, to Irving A. Williamson, Chairman,
Int’l Trade Comm’n 2 (Aug. 3, 2013), https://ustr.gov/sites/default/ﬁles/08032013%20Letter_1.PDF
[https://perma.cc/AD57-DKFC] (citing patent holdup as one of the bases for his veto).
11 Ericsson, Inc., 773 F.3d at 1226, 1232.
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“reasonable rates,”12 with support from the Department of Justice in
the form of a favorable business review letter.13
• The Federal Trade Commission and its European and Asian
counterparts took several actions to prevent owners of SEPs from
behaving opportunistically by seeking injunctions on FRANDencumbered patents.14
Further progress to limit patent holdup can be made in three areas.
• Private Contracts: industry participants can do more to prevent patent
holdup. Notably, more Standards Setting Organizations (“SSOs”)
can follow the lead of the IEEE by clarifying and strengthening their
FRAND policies and creating mechanisms to enforce those policies.
• Patent Law: the courts can continue to build the case law establishing
that patent damages should be based on the value of the patented
invention to the infringing party prior to that party making
investments speciﬁc to that technology, and simplifying patent
damages to insure that reasonable royalties do not exceed that
incremental value.
• Antitrust Enforcement: as a backstop, competition authorities can
promote innovation and protect consumers by taking appropriate
enforcement actions against ﬁrms that abuse the market power
associated with SEPs and/or breach their FRAND commitments to
avoid those patent and contract law limits.

12 See IEEE-SA STANDARDS BOARD BYLAWS §6 at 2, http://standards.ieee.org/develop
/policies/bylaws/approved-changes.pdf [https://perma.cc/P9P8-4MKA] (last visited May 20, 2020)
(deﬁning “Reasonable Rates” as “appropriate compensation to the patent holder for the practice of
an Essential Patent Claim excluding the value, if any, resulting from the inclusion of that Essential
Patent Claim’s technology in the IEEE Standard” and including a list of considerations for
determining reasonable rates).
13 Letter from Renata B. Hesse, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Michael
A.
Lindsay,
Esquire,
Dorsey
&
Whitney
LLP
6
(Feb.
2,
2015)
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/busreview/311470.pdf [https://perma.cc/258G-5TXF] (noting
that IEEE’s new RAND commitment “may further help to mitigate hold up”).
14 The FTC enforcement actions were taken against Bosch and Google. In re Robert Bosch
GmbH Corp., 155 F.T.C. 713 (2013); Mototola Mobility LLC & Google Inc., 156 F.T.C. 147 (2013).
In Europe, the Court of Justice of the European Union issued injunctive relief for violating FRAND
terms. Case C-170/13, Huawei Techs. Co. Ltd v. ZTE Corp., EU:C:2015:477 at 10-11 (July 16, 2015).
Chinese and Korean courts issued similar injunctive relief against Motorola and Samsung. See
Esther H. Lim & C. Brandon Rash, China Court Swiftly Enforces U.S. Company’s IP Rights Against
Chinese Company in Motorola v. Guangzhou Weierwei, FINNEGAN (Mar. 2008)
https://www.ﬁnnegan.com/en/insights/articles/china-court-swiftly-enforces-u-s-company-s-iprights-against.html [https://perma.cc/D8AS-P3SZ] (describing a Chinese court issuing such
injunctive relief against Motorola); Eric Pfanner, Korean Court Rejects Samsung Lawsuit Against Apple,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 12, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/13/technology/korean-court-rejectssamsung-lawsuit-against-apple.html [https://perma.cc/CF5Y-GPPD] (describing a Korean court
issuing such injunctive relief against Apple).
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We focus below on the role of antitrust enforcement in limiting patent
holdup. However, we emphasize that we see private contracts and patent law
as the primary methods to prevent patent holdup. Antitrust is a complement
and a backstop to these methods, not a substitute for them.15 If SSOs were to
adopt and enforce eﬀective FRAND policies and courts were to give them
eﬀect in both contract and patent law, most of the patent holdup problem
would go away.16 Even then, however, antitrust would still be necessary in
some circumstances to prevent companies from undermining or evading their
FRAND commitments, as was the case in Rambus Inc. v. FTC,17 Broadcom
Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc.,18 and FTC v. Qualcomm Inc.19
Unfortunately, antitrust enforcement to prevent patent holdup is in danger
of becoming less effective due to the policy positions currently being taken by
the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice. These new policy
positions appear to be based a specious argument that patent holdup is rare or
unproven, combined with a fundamental misconception about the proper role
of patents in a market economy. Ironically, while patent and contract law can
largely solve the patent holdup problem, and while progress on those fronts
has been made in the past, the Antitrust Division is undermining those efforts
in ways that might require stronger antitrust intervention.
In Part I, we discuss transaction cost economics and the general theory of
holdup. In Part II, we draw on our prior work to explain how these general
principles apply to the particular case of patent holdup. Part III addresses
various ways of limiting patent holdup, focusing on the role of antitrust and
the recent eﬀorts by some, including the Trump Administration, to undo
recent progress in this area.
I. TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS AND THE GENERAL THEORY OF
HOLDUP
Transactions cost economics explores how for-proﬁt ﬁrms in a market
economy structure their aﬀairs to promote eﬃcient investment in productive
15 See Mark A. Lemley, Ten Things to Do About Patent Holdup of Standards (and One Not to), 48
B.C. L. REV. 149, 167 (2007) [hereinafter Lemley, Ten Things] (“[A]ntitrust law serves a valuable
purpose, but where the holdup problem is concerned, it is a backstop.”).
16 See Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, A Simple Approach to Setting Reasonable Royalties for
Standard-Essential Patents, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1135, 1166 (2013) [hereinafter Lemley &
Shapiro, A Simple Approach] (“SSOs can and should adopt best practices that will prevent patentee
holdup while ensuring that the question of the appropriate royalty is resolved in a fair and
predictable way.”).
17 522 F.3d 456, 459 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
18 501 F.3d 297, 304-05 (3d Cir. 2007).
19 411 F. Supp. 3d 658, 672-74 (N.D. Cal. 2019). Shapiro testiﬁed on behalf of the FTC in the
Qualcomm case. For a further discussion of this case, including a critique of the Ninth Circuit
decision in August 2020 reversing the District Court, see infra Section III.C.
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assets.20 Oliver Williamson in particular stressed the dangers of opportunism
that can arise in the presence of relationship-speciﬁc investments. Williamson
recently explained:
TCE [transaction cost economics] gave early prominence to the relatively
neglected condition of asset specificity, which became a crucial deﬁning
attribute of transactions. Asset speciﬁcity describes the condition where the
identity of the parties matters for the continuity of a relationship . . . . these
assets cannot be redeployed to alternative uses or users without loss of
productive value.21

Williamson has long emphasized what he calls the fundamental
transformation that occurs when parties make relationship-speciﬁc
investments: ex ante competition can be replaced by ex post monopoly.22 This
is the problem of holdup: the owner of a key asset can charge more than the
asset is worth ex ante if the buyer has made asset-speciﬁc investments that
will be lost unless the parties agree on terms of trade.
A. The Conditions Under Which the Holdup Problem Is Greatest
As with all great ideas in microeconomics, the general theory of holdup
identiﬁes a simple and robust economic concept that is amenable to empirical
testing and validation. The core idea behind the theory of holdup is that a
party that makes substantial investments, the value of which relies heavily
upon the actions of another party, is vulnerable to exploitation by that other
party and thus may have lessened incentives to invest. This core idea is
intuitive and very general.
Naturally, a party making a large relationship-specific investment has a strong
incentive to protect itself from ex post exploitation. Over the past fifty years, the

20 Oliver Williamson was awarded the 2009 Nobel Prize in Economics “for his analysis of
economic governance, especially the boundaries of the ﬁrm.” Ronald Coase was awarded the 1991
Nobel Prize in Economics “for his discovery and clariﬁcation of the signiﬁcance of transaction costs
and property rights for the institutional structure and functioning of the economy.”
21 Steven Tadelis & Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction Cost Economics, in THE HANDBOOK OF
ORGANIZATIONAL ECONOMICS 159, § 3.1.1, at 164 (Robert Gibbons & John Roberts eds., 2012)
(emphasis in original) (citations omitted). Williamson was exploring these ideas over forty years
ago. See Oliver E. Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies: Some Elementary Considerations, 63 AM.
ECON. REV. 316, 317-18 (1973) (noting that the cost advantages of ﬁrm-speciﬁc knowledge lead to
smaller pools of potential players); Oliver E. Williamson, The Vertical Integration of Production:
Market Failure Considerations, 61 AM. ECON. REV. 112, 116 (1971) (describing the cost advantage of
prior players with ﬁrm-speciﬁc knowledge).
22 See, e.g., Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual
Relations, 22 J.L. & ECON. 233, 241 (1979) (“[Initial] large-numbers competition . . . is quickly
thereafter transformed into one of bilateral monopoly—on account of the transaction-speciﬁc
costs . . . .”) (emphasis in original).
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field of transaction cost economics has grown rapidly based on its powerful ability
to use asset specificity to explain fundamental business relationships. Notable
successes include explaining the presence or absence of vertical integration and
the design and use of long-term contracts. Both are mechanisms designed to
guard against holdup. In such settings, the terms that well-informed parties
would negotiate ex ante provide the competitive benchmark against which
potential solutions to the problem of holdup can be evaluated.23
As Williamson has emphasized since the 1970s, the potential for holdup—
which we will refer to as “the holdup problem”—is greatest in situations
where one party invests heavily in assets that are speciﬁc to its relationship
with another party. Situations where eﬃciency requires substantial
investment in relationship-speciﬁc assets are very common: the worker
moving to take a new job and learning skills speciﬁc to that job; the tenant
customizing rental space to suit its preferences and needs; the supplier of
specialized components investing to serve a large customer; and a ﬁrm
developing and designing a new product that might later be found to infringe
another party’s patent. Likewise, Klein, Crawford and Alchian, in their
seminal 1978 paper, emphasized the risk of “post-contractual opportunistic
behavior” after such investments are made.24 They state: “After a speciﬁc
investment is made and such quasi rents are created, the possibility of
opportunistic behavior is very real.”25
Managing the holdup problem is most diﬃcult in dynamic and uncertain
environments where ex ante contracts are necessarily incomplete in
signiﬁcant respects. Much of the theoretical literature has explored the
optimal design of long-term contracts, while the empirical literature has
identiﬁed contracting imperfections and obstacles in a variety of diﬀerent
settings.26

23 This competitive benchmark is both sensible and practical: sensible because it rewards a
supplier based on its superiority over its competitors, and practical because it does not require
invoking any pre-speciﬁed notion of competition, much less perfect competition (which would make
no sense when we get to patent holdup).
24 Benjamin Klein, Robert G. Crawford & Armen A. Alchian, Vertical Integration, Appropriable
Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, J.L. & ECON. 297, 297 (1978).
25 Id. at 298; see also Tadelis & Williamson, supra note 21, § 3.1.1, at 164 (“[T]hese [transactionspeciﬁc] assets cannot be redeployed to alternative uses or users without loss of productive value.”);
Oliver Williamson, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 64 (1985) (“[S]ome
individuals are opportunistic some of the time and that diﬀerential trustworthiness is rarely
transparent ex ante.”).
26 See generally Tadelis & Williamson, supra note 21; Timothy Bresnahan & Jonathan Levin,
Vertical Integration and Market Structure, in THE HANDBOOK OF ORGANIZATIONAL ECONOMICS
853 (Robert Gibbons & John Roberts eds., 2012).
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The Social Costs of Holdup

Holdup causes several types of social costs. First, there are costs
associated with whatever arrangements are used to control and limit holdup.
Second, to the extent that those arrangements are imperfect, parties making
speciﬁc investments will not be fully protected from holdup, so their
incentives to invest and innovate will be undermined, creating deadweight
loss and ineﬃciency. Third, actual holdups can create ex post ineﬃciencies
and deadweight losses of the sort normally associated with monopoly power.
Fourth, the prospect of engaging in hold-up can lead to ineﬃcient rentseeking behavior by parties trying to place themselves in a position to behave
opportunistically. This welfare analysis is very similar to the analysis of the
social costs associated with the problem of theft, which include analogous
categories: (1) the costs incurred to prevent or mitigate actual thefts; (2) the
deadweight loss associated with activities deterred due to the fear of theft;
(3) the costs caused by actual thefts that nonetheless occur; and (4) the cost
of activities undertaken by would-be thieves to engage in theft.27
While it is diﬃcult to measure the social costs caused by the holdup
problem, we can be conﬁdent that these costs are elevated by legal rules or
other public policies that make it more diﬃcult for market participants to
structure their relationships to manage holdup eﬃciently. This will be
important below when we discuss SSO rules to control SEP holdup.
C. Market Responses to Holdup
Market participants will structure their relationships as best they can to
avoid or minimize the ineﬃciencies associated with opportunism. Three
mechanisms stand out as common responses to the problem of holdup: (1)
vertical integration, which aligns interests by placing both parties to the
relationship inside a single ﬁrm; (2) long-term contracts, which ideally can be
designed to protect the party making the speciﬁc investments while
rewarding the other party based on its ex ante superiority over alternatives;
and (3) ﬂexibility, whereby the party making the investments shifts from
speciﬁc investments toward more general investments in order to reduce its
reliance on the other party. Classic examples in the empirical literature
include vertical integration in the automobile and aerospace industries, the

27 For seminal work on this topic, see Gordon Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tariﬀs, Monopolies,
and Theft, 5 W. ECON. J. 224 (1967). Similarly, Gibbons describes the three sources of “transactional
failures” that arise in “[d]iﬃcult [t]ransactions,” namely: “(a) unprogrammed adaption because ex
ante contracts are incomplete, (b) lock-in arising from the ‘fundamental transformation’ and (c)
haggling (i.e. ineﬃcient bargaining) because ex post contracts are incomplete.” Robert Gibbons,
Transaction-Cost Economics: Past, Present and Future?, 112 SCANDINAVIAN J. ECON. 263, 268 (2010).

2028

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 168: 2019

structure of contracts between franchisors and franchisees, and the duration
of contracts for the supply of coal and natural gas.
However, when efficiency calls for substantial investments in specific assets,
there is no costless way to solve the holdup problem. Each of the three
mechanisms above comes with its own costs. Vertical integration may deprive the
downstream firm of the benefits of competition and innovation among input
suppliers. Preserving flexibility, through dual sourcing or relying on standardized
inputs, sacrifices some of the efficiencies associated with specific investments.
The general theory of holdup does not predict that actual ex post holdups
will be common, even in situations where the holdup problem is substantial.
To the contrary, under the general theory of holdup, actual ex post holdups
represent failures by market participants to eﬃciently structure their
relationships. Indeed, transaction cost economics predicts that such failures
will be relatively rare in stable, well-understood business settings with limited
private information, at least for transactions between sophisticated parties
taking place in economies where property rights are well-deﬁned, contract
law is well-developed, and contracts are reliably enforceable. But that does
not mean that holdup is not a problem, or that successful eﬀorts to avoid it
by altering existing business relationships are costless.
D. Empirical Support for the General Theory of Holdup
An impressive body of empirical work supports the general theory of
holdup described above. Literally hundreds of papers have been published in
peer-reviewed journals developing and testing the general theory of holdup.
As Robert Gibbons, one of the editors of the Handbook of Organizational
Economics, stated in his article on transaction cost economics, “the huge body
of TCE literature is overwhelmingly empirical.”28
One extensive line of research uses transaction cost economics to explain
the scope and incidence of vertical integration.29 Put diﬀerently, these papers
use transaction cost economics to explain the “make vs. buy” decisions of
ﬁrms. A closely related line of research uses transaction cost economics to
explain how ﬁrms structure their contractual relationships. Shelanski and
Klein provide an early survey of this literature.30 As they conclude, “Studies

Id. at 273.
See Josh Wright, Klein v. Coase III: Fisher Body-General Motors Again (and Again), TRUTH
ON THE MARKET (Mar. 14, 2007), http://truthonthemarket.com/2007/03/14/klein-v-coase-iii-ﬁsherbody-general-motors-again-and-again/ [https://perma.cc/4Z8C-9FDN] (“The holdup theory and
the relationship between asset speciﬁcity and vertical integration is perhaps the most empirically
tested economic propositions [sic] of modern industrial organization.”).
30 See Howard A. Shelanski & Peter G. Klein, Empirical Research in Transaction Cost Economics:
A Review and Assessment, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 335, 341-50 (1995) (surveying “vertical integration,
28
29
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that examine the make-or-buy decision and the structure of long-term
contracts, in particular, overwhelmingly conﬁrm transaction cost economic
predictions.”31 Masten assembles some of the best early empirical articles on
vertical integration and vertical contracting.32 Whinston notes that “TCE
predicts that any increase in quasi-rents will increase the likelihood of vertical
integration (a ﬁnding that is so far consistent with nearly all of the existing
empirical literature).”33 Macher and Richtman reviewed “over 3,500 abstracts
from which [they] obtained approximately 900 articles that empirically test
some aspect of TCE theory.”34 After recognizing considerable variability in
the quality of the empirical work that they surveyed, they concluded, “[e]ven
so, the volume of our ﬁndings lend considerable support overall for the main
predictions of TCE.”35
In addition, there is an enormous amount of anecdotal evidence based on
long-term contracts between sophisticated parties in situations where substantial
specific investments are involved and the parties come to rely on each other. It
is safe to say that anyone who has seen a good number of such contracts will
confirm that they normally contain provisions by which one party obtains price
and performance protections to limit opportunism by the other party.
E. Actual Holdups Are Very Diﬃcult to Measure
As just noted, the extensive empirical support for the general theory of
holdup consists primarily of studies showing that ﬁrms structure their
relationships to avoid or minimize the adverse eﬀects of holdup. Critically,
the evidence does not involve quantifying the magnitude of actual ex post
‘hybrid’ contracting modes, long-term commercial contracts, informal agreements, and franchise
contracting”).
31 Id. at 352. Shelanski and Klein note the presence of some conﬂicting evidence, but go on to
say, “[t]aken as a whole, the body of empirical research in TCE shows that a good deal of economic
activity aligns with transactions in the manner predicted by the theory.” Id. They then concur with
Paul Joskow’s view that the empirical evidence in transaction cost economics is in “much better shape
than much of the empirical work in industrial organization generally.” Id. (quoting Paul L. Joskow,
The Role of Transaction Cost Economics in Antitrust and Public Utility Regulatory Policies, 7 J.L. ECON.
& ORG. 53 (1991)).
32 See CASE STUDIES IN CONTRACTING AND ORGANIZATION (Scott Masten, ed.) (1996).
33 Michael D. Whinston, On the Transaction Cost Determinants of Vertical Integration, 19 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 1, 2 (2003).
34 Jeﬀrey T. Macher & Barak D. Richman, Transaction Cost Economics: An Assessment of
Empirical Research in the Social Sciences, 10 BUS. & POL. 1, 2 (2008). Macher and Richman are
especially interested in the “reach of transaction cost applications in ﬁelds outside [industrial
organization] economics and in a variety of social sciences.” Id. at 42-43.
35 Id. at 43. See also Bresnahan & Levin, supra note 26, §3, at 862 (characterizing the empirical
evidence as “quite favorable” for transaction-cost theory); Francine Lafontaine & Margaret Slade,
Vertical Integration and Firm Boundaries: The Evidence, 45 J. ECON. LITERATURE 629, 658 (2007)
(“[V]irtually all predictions from transaction-cost analysis appear to be borne out by the data.”).
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holdups.36 Indeed, the empirical literature on holdup has relatively few
documented examples of large-scale actual holdups.37 This will be important
below when we turn to evaluating the empirical evidence regarding patent
holdup in particular.
Anticipating the arguments being made by those who deny that the patent
holdup problem is real and signiﬁcant, it is instructive to ask why the
empirical literature on the general holdup problem has not proceeded by
measuring the frequency or magnitude of actual holdups.
In part this is for a very good conceptual reason: the theory predicts that
market participants will structure their aﬀairs to avoid or mitigate actual
holdups. As stressed above, the social costs caused by the holdup problem can
be large even if large-scale holdups are very infrequent. The validity of the
general theory of holdup, and the importance of the holdup problem, do not
hinge on the frequency or magnitude of actual holdups.
But practical considerations also play a big role in explaining why the very
large empirical literature on the holdup problem includes few documented
instances of actual holdups. Even in situations where such holdups take place,
they are exceedingly diﬃcult for researchers to reliably detect and quantify.
To see why, denote the holdup (ex post monopoly) price by 𝑃𝑃! and the ex
ante competitive price by 𝑃𝑃∗ . The (per-unit) magnitude of the actual ex post
holdup is equal to (𝑃𝑃! − 𝑃𝑃∗ ). Measuring either component of this diﬀerence
can pose quite a challenge for researchers. Actual transaction prices in
complex business-to-business transactions are rarely observable by
researchers. Plus, even when a measure of price is available, it typically is
confounded by other terms and conditions, making 𝑃𝑃! very hard to observe.
Coming up with a good measure of the competitive benchmark price 𝑃𝑃∗ is
even harder, since it reﬂects a counterfactual and since the transactions at
issue are by nature idiosyncratic. Practical considerations also explain why the
empirical literature on the holdup problem includes few documented
instances in which the prospect of holdup has discouraged investment. The
resulting reduction in investment typically will not normally be observable to
researchers, much less attributable to holdup.
36 Lafontaine and Slade explain that empirical work regarding inter-ﬁrm contracts has been
quite successful at explaining the incidence of various practices, but less successful at quantifying the
eﬀects of these practices, primarily because such quantiﬁcation would require access to data that is
typically proprietary. Francine Lafontaine & Margaret E. Slade, Inter-Firm Contracts, in THE
HANDBOOK OF ORGANIZATIONAL ECONOMICS §3.2 (Robert Gibbons & John Roberts eds., 2013).
37 Perhaps the most famous example involves General Motors and Fisher Body. See Benjamin
Klein, Fisher-General Motors and the Nature of the Firm, 43 J.L. & ECON. 105, 106-26 (2000) (detailing
Fisher Body’s holdup of General Motors after General Motor’s demand for Fisher’s products exceeded
supply). Yet even this famous example is hotly disputed as a factual matter. See Ramon CasadesusMasanell & Daniel F. Spulber, The Fable of Fisher Body, 43 J.L. & ECON. 67, 76 (2000) (“[A] number of
significant aspects of the [Fisher Body] account in the economics literature are incorrect.”).
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For all of these reasons, scholars studying the holdup problem widely agree
that the general theory of holdup is very well supported empirically without
expecting, much less demanding, a body of empirical work measuring actual
holdups. This same sensible approach should be applied to patent holdup.
When we turn to look at patent holdup below, we will examine the two
types of evidence used in the more general empirical literature on holdup.
First, we look for evidence identifying situations in which the patent holdup
problem is signiﬁcant. The telltale marker that the patent holdup problem is
signiﬁcant in a given setting is the presence of substantial investments speciﬁc
to a given patent or patent portfolio. Second, we look for evidence that the
mechanisms used to manage the patent holdup problem are costly or
imperfect. There is clear evidence that the mechanisms used by SSOs to
manage SEP holdup are costly and imperfect.
F. The Role of Antitrust in Limiting Holdup Generally
Antitrust can assist contract law and other private arrangements to limit
holdup in some circumstances. In many cases, holdup is purely a private matter
involving two parties, such as a landlord and a tenant, or a coal mine and a
railroad. In those cases, where holdup or its prospect does not have marketwide
effects and does not harm third parties, antitrust is generally unnecessary.
Other legal doctrines, including contract law, criminal and civil antifraud laws,
and tort law, suffice. Furthermore, antitrust law must be careful not to impede
private solutions to the holdup problem, as when rivals engage in cross licensing
to allow themselves greater freedom to design new products.38 However, when
holdup has marketwide effects that cause harm to third parties, including
consumers, antitrust has a role to play in preventing holdup. Antitrust law is
especially needed when the incidence of holdup falls on downstream customers
rather than intermediaries. This can occur when a platform company follows
an “open early, closed late” strategy, building its market position with a promise
of openness that it later breaches.39 Such a policy standing alone might not
violate the antitrust law; it could simply be contractual opportunism.40 But both
deliberate misrepresentations that a standard will remain open and breach of a
38 See Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard Setting, in
1 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 120, 130 (Adam B. Jaffe, Josh Lerner & Scott Stern eds.,
2000) (“From the perspective of competition policy, cross licenses of this sort are quite attractive.”).
39 See Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Could Java Change Everything? The Competitive
Propriety of a Proprietary Standard, 43 ANTITRUST BULL. 715, 770-71 (1998) (discussing the risk that
Java would gain popularity as an open platform and then close the platform). That risk came to pass;
Oracle bought Sun and closed Java. For a discussion of the costs faced by consumers locked in by
this “open early, closed late” strategy, see CARL SHAPIRO & HAL R. VARIAN, INFORMATION
RULES 103-34 (1999).
40 Lemley & McGowan, supra note 39.
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contractual commitment to keep it open can serve to interfere with competition
in a way antitrust law should care about.
The role of antitrust in limiting holdup has been explored extensively in
the antitrust treatment of practices involving aftermarkets. Consider a
manufacturer of a durable good that competes with other manufacturers by
promising not to discriminate against third parties who service its equipment,
so customers can be assured of competition in the aftermarket to service the
equipment. This is a contractual solution to the holdup problem faced by
customers. Suppose, after building up an installed base of users, this
manufacturer breaches that commitment and monopolizes the aftermarket for
servicing the equipment, perhaps as part of a strategy to harvest the installed
base through inflated service charges while exiting the equipment market.
That type of breach of contract is likely to harm customers by disrupting the
competitive process. Those are the key elements of an antitrust violation.41
Antitrust also can guard against deceptive practices that undermine
various contractual and organizational mechanisms designed to prevent
holdup. Parties seeking to beneﬁt from holdup may engage in fraud or other
deceptive or misleading conduct that prevents third parties, including
consumers, from enjoying the beneﬁts of competition or from creating
eﬃcient private arrangements to avoid holdup. For example, they may
conceal information ex ante in order to avoid triggering a negotiation until
after their power is locked in, as Unocal and Rambus both did in hiding their
patents from standard-setting organizations.42 Antitrust prohibits that
misbehavior, ensuring that parties have the information and ability to
contract privately to avoid holdup.
II. PATENT HOLDUP
A. Theory of Patent Holdup
Patent holdup is a speciﬁc application of the general theory of holdup.
When an actual ex post patent holdup occurs in the form of a patent license,
its (per-unit) magnitude equals the diﬀerence between the royalty rate
obtained by the patent holder and the royalty rate the patent holder would
have been able to negotiate prior to the licensee making investments speciﬁc
41 For a real-life example of this type of fact pattern, see Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech.
Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
42 See Rambus Inc. v. FTC, 522 F.3d 456, 459 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (reporting the FTC’s ﬁndings
that Rambus “deceptively failed to disclose” its patent interests in four standardized technologies);
Union Oil Co. of California, 140 F.T.C. 123, 125 (2005) (alleging that Union Oil pursued patents
while misrepresenting to regulatory authority that the relevant research was in the public domain).
Shapiro testiﬁed on behalf of the FTC in the Unocal case.
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to practicing the patent. The royalty rate without holdup reﬂects the intrinsic
value of the patented invention, which will be large for major inventions.
Nothing we say should be taken to suggest that a patent holder should be
prevented from obtaining the reasonable royalty rate that reﬂects the ex ante
incremental value of its inventions, properly discounted to reﬂect the chance
that the patent is invalid or not infringed.43 Rather, our concern is with the
ability of patent owners to capture more than that intrinsic value by
exploiting the irreversible investments made by the licensee.
Patent holdup, like all holdup, arises when products and services require
speciﬁc investments. In this context, an investment to develop a new product
is “speciﬁc” to a given patent to the extent that it cannot readily be transferred
to a product that does not infringe that patent.44 If the patent holder owns a
whole portfolio of patents, an investment to develop the new product is
“speciﬁc” to that portfolio if it cannot be transferred to a product that avoids
infringing the entire portfolio of patents.45
Due to the probabilistic nature of patents, patent holdup does not require
surprise or ambush: it can occur even if the ﬁrm developing a new product is
well informed and able to negotiate with the patent holder before making any
speciﬁc investments. We prove this as theoretical matter in a simple
bargaining model in prior work.46 Patent holdup without surprise can occur
because both outside options available to the ﬁrm developing the new
product, in its ex ante negotiation with the patent holder, are costly to that
ﬁrm. The ﬁrst outside option is to design its new product to avoid any danger
of later being found to infringe the patent. The cost of designing around the
patent is the same, regardless of the probability that the patent will later be
found invalid or not infringed by the new product. As a result, the royalties
paid by a ﬁrm negotiating based on this outside option will be unreasonably
high, especially for weak patents. The second outside option is to proceed
ahead with product development and face the possibility of later being found
to infringe the patent. But invoking this option negates the value to the
downstream ﬁrm of knowing about the patent in advance and leaves that ﬁrm
43 See Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV.
1991, 1999 (2007) [hereinafter Lemley & Shapiro, Patent Holdup] (“[T]he [reasonable and expected]
royalty rate must be discounted to reﬂect patent strength.”).
44 In many cases, an infringing product can be redesigned to avoid infringing, but this process
takes time, so it does not avoid holdup altogether.
45 This assessment must be based on the patent portfolios that will be in place after the ﬁrm
introduces its product. Patent holdup can arise, or become more severe, due to a horizontal
consolidation of patents reading on the ﬁrm’s product, or because a practicing entity who would not
assert its patents due to the cost of a countersuit sells its patents to a Patent Assertion Entity (PAE).
46 See Lemley & Shapiro, Patent Holdup, supra note 43, at 2003-05 (setting forth the “early
negotiation” model); Carl Shapiro, Injunctions, Hold-Up, and Patent Royalties, 12 AM. L. & ECON.
REV. 280, 298-300 (2010) [hereinafter Shapiro, Injunctions] (same).
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vulnerable to ex post holdup. As a result, negotiating based on this outside
option also leads to unreasonably high royalties.47
Based on the general theory of holdup and the results just described, the
danger of patent holdup is greatest when (1) a ﬁrm is developing a new
product that may (or may not) later be found to infringe a patent, and (2)
eﬃcient development of that new product requires that ﬁrm to make
substantial investments that are speciﬁc to the patent(s) in question. Patent
holdup does not require “surprise” and can be especially problematic for
vague or weak patents. Furthermore, the patent holdup problem is
exacerbated if multiple ﬁrms own such patents, leading to royalty stacking.48
Notably, the harm caused by the holdup problem here often does not take the
form of an injunction shutting down a product for patent infringement.
Rather, its most common form is the payment of unreasonably high royalties
to the patentee to avoid the costly and ineﬃcient measures to avoid the
holdup that patentee could otherwise impose.
B. Evidence of Patent Holdup
We now turn to the empirical evidence relating to patent holdup. We
address both categories of evidence identiﬁed above relating to the general
theory of holdup.
1. The Patent Holdup Problem Is Signiﬁcant for Many High-Tech Products
Large patent-speciﬁc investments are common in the information and
communications technology (ICT) sector.49 When SEPs covering widely
used compatibility standards are involved, the presence of large speciﬁc
investments surely is the norm. After all, any investment that would be lost
if the infringing ﬁrm were forced to stop selling all of its compatible products
is speciﬁc to even a single SEP.
The signiﬁcance of patent-speciﬁc investments in any particular patent
infringement case is an empirical question that depends upon the facts of that
case. In an individual case where a party is arguing that it is subject to ex post
patent holdup, that party should be required to establish that it has made
signiﬁcant investments speciﬁc to the patent or patent portfolio in question.50
For a fuller discussion of this point, see Shapiro, Injunctions, supra note 46.
Lemley & Shapiro, Patent Holdup, supra note 43.
See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 1, at 3-4, 35-36 (explaining that the ITC sector relies on
a variety of patented technologies that must be licensed or designed around); U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. &
FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 1, at 43 n.50 (noting the costly nature of SEPs in the ICT sector).
50 This assessment should be made under the assumption that the patent(s) involved are valid
and infringed. Additionally, a party seeking in advance to avoid patent holdup may argue that it will
likely make such speciﬁc investments, or would do so in the absence of the threat of patent holdup.
47
48
49
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In cases involving SEPs reading on widely used industry standards,
noncompliant products are unlikely to be commercially viable, so it will
normally be suﬃcient for the party to show that it has made signiﬁcant
investments speciﬁc to the product category in question.
Notably, a company does not need to be aware of a particular patent to
make an investment speciﬁc to that patent. Indeed, the vast majority of
holdup cases (and indeed the vast majority of patent lawsuits) involve patents
discovered only after the investment is made.51 The fact that the patent can
be argued by its owner to cover the speciﬁc investment is what gives rise to
the holdup problem.
2. Managing the Patent Holdup Problem is Very Diﬃcult for High-Tech
Products
The general theory of holdup suggests several mechanisms that a firm
developing a new product might employ to protect itself from patent holdup.
To be effective, these mechanisms must be deployed prior to the firm’s
development effort. First, the firm might vertically integrate, which in the case
of patent holdup would mean acquiring the patents in question. Second, the
firm might sign a longterm contract, which in the case of patent holdup would
mean entering into a long-term licensing contract with the patent holder prior
to product development. Third, the firm might retain flexibility to use other
inputs, which in the case of patent holdup would mean designing its product to
allow it to easily and rapidly modify its product to avoid infringement.
We do indeed see each of these responses in some cases, but the mechanisms
normally used to limit holdup often do not work well to prevent patent holdup.
This implies that the social costs caused by patent holdup also will be high. In
prior work, we and others identify a number of factors that make it very
difficult for firms developing new products in the information technology and
communications sector to protect themselves from patent holdup:52
• Broad Patents with Vague Boundaries. Many U.S. patents have broad
claims with vague boundaries, making it diﬃcult to determine in
advance whether a new product will infringe them, especially since
product development takes time and is uncertain.53

51 See Christopher A. Cotropia & Mark A. Lemley, Copying in Patent Law, 87 N.C. L. REV.
1421, 1442, 1446 (2009) (reporting that only 31.1% of patent infringement cases “involve[] allegations
that the defendant was even aware of the patent before the lawsuit,” and the number was much
smaller in the IT industries).
52 See Lemley & Shapiro, Patent Holdup, supra note 43, at 1992 (noting that products in the
ITC sector “can easily be covered by dozens or even hundreds of diﬀerent patents”).
53 JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES,
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 54-56 (2008).
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•

Uncertainty About Future Product Attributes. A ﬁrm developing a new
product may not know its speciﬁc features until well down the
development path.54
• No Independent Invention Defense. A product infringes a patent even
if the ﬁrm developed that product entirely on its own, as is the norm
in patent infringement cases.55
• Weak Patents. Nearly 75% of patent suits fail.56 Even the small number
of cases that involve defendants aware of a patent at the time they
invest often involve patents that should not have issued or that are
been claimed to cover something they do not plausibly reach. A weak
patent can give rise to patent holdup even if the ﬁrm is fully aware
of that patent when it launches its development eﬀort.
• Patent Pendency Lags. Patents take 3-4 years to issue on average.57
Even if a ﬁrm carefully reads all pertinent patent applications when
they are published, and steers well clear of their claims, that ﬁrm can
still be exposed to patent holdup due to the lag between a patent’s
priority date and the publication of that patent application by the
United States Patent and Trademark Oﬃce (PTO). That is
especially true since patent applicants can and do modify their claims
during the patent prosecution process to cover products they see
being introduced in the market and ongoing standardization
eﬀorts.58
• Patent Thickets. Many patents may plausibly be asserted against a
single product, and these patents are likely to be held by multiple
owners.59
In certain other industries, by contrast, a ﬁrm planning to develop a new
product can easily identify the single ﬁrm that owns strong, clear patents that
Lemley & Shapiro, Patent Holdup, supra note 43.
Cotropia & Lemley, supra note 51, at 1425-26.
John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley & David L. Schwartz, Understanding the Realities of Modern
Patent Litigation, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1769, 1787-88 (2014).
57 Mark A. Lemley, Fixing the Patent Oﬃce 11 n.43 (Stan. L. & Econ. Olin Working Paper,
Paper No. 422, 2013), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2023958 [https://perma.
cc/N5NE-YHWD].
58 In Kingsdown Medical Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., the Federal Circuit stated that “there
is nothing improper, illegal or inequitable in ﬁling a patent application for the purpose of obtaining
a right to exclude a known competitor’s product from the market.” 863 F.2d 867, 874 (Fed. Cir.
1988). “[N]or,” noted the Federal Circuit, “is it in any manner improper to amend or insert claims
intended to cover a competitor’s product the applicant’s attorney has learned about during the
prosecution of a patent application.” Id.; see also Mark A. Lemley & Kimberly A. Moore, Ending
Abuse of Patent Continuations, 84 B.U. L. REV. 63, 69 (2004) (noting that ﬁrms use continuation
applications to “track changes in the marketplace”).
59 Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 35 (2005);
Shapiro supra note 38, at 126.
54
55
56
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are likely to be asserted against that product. In those situations, if entry
raises joint proﬁts, an ex ante licensing contract could work well. Thus, ﬁrms
in industries like pharmaceuticals or medical devices tend to identify the
(many fewer, more certain) holders of potentially critical patent rights and
either negotiate a license up front or change the way they design their
product. Most new high-tech products, and certainly those complying with
popular industry standards, do not ﬁt this more benign fact pattern.
For all of these reasons, holdup tends to be a thornier problem in the
information technology and telecommunications industries. As an illustrative
example, there are strong reasons to believe that eﬀectively avoiding patent
holdup is more diﬃcult for a ﬁrm developing a new industrial robot than in
the typical bilateral holdup situation studied in the transaction cost
economics literature, such as an electric utility building a new generating
facility that relies on a speciﬁc mine to supply coal, or an entrepreneur
opening a new franchise. The electric utility can enter into a long-term
contract with the mine or acquire the mine if necessary. The entrepreneur can
sign a detailed long-term contract with the franchisor. In contrast, for the
reasons given above, the robot maker will have diﬃculty even identifying all
of the (possibly thousands of) patents that might be asserted in the future
against its new robot, many of which might not issue until the robot maker is
well down the road in its development process.
Furthermore, even for those patents that can conﬁdently be identiﬁed in
advance, there are substantial transaction costs associated with each of the
three mechanisms normally used to avoid holdup.
• Vertical Integration. Vertical integration is rarely a good solution for
patent holdup. If one robot manufacturer purchases a group of
patents and patent applications that are likely to be asserted against
tomorrow’s robots, the danger of patent holdup may actually become
greater for the other robot manufacturers.60 This suggests that patent
holdup would best be mitigated overall if a group of robot
manufacturers purchases these patents. However, that solution
involves its own substantial transaction costs, not to mention
potential antitrust exposure. Further, there are just too many patents
to make this feasible in the information technology sector.
• Long-Term Contracts. Long-term ex ante patent licensing contracts
intended to cover future products involve substantial transaction
costs. Our robot manufacturer is likely to have a relatively poor sense
60 This can happen because a robot manufacturer asserting the patent is more likely than a
non-practicing entity to be able to obtain an injunction against other robot manufacturers, and
because one robot manufacturer gains by excluding or raising the costs of its rivals. These forces can
be oﬀset if the party subject to holdup has its own patents that can be asserted in a countersuit.
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of what its future products will look like when it ﬁrst begins
developing them, yet that is the point in time when it must begin
making substantial speciﬁc investments. Furthermore, it may be very
diﬃcult for the robot maker to identify all of the patents that might
be asserted against its future products, or what the scope of those
patents will be, especially for patent applications that have not yet
been issued or that will later be ﬁled as continuations. On top of that,
there may well be multiple parties who have applied for patents that
are likely to be asserted against the new robots, raising issues of
royalty stacking, which multiplies the patent holdup problem. For all
of these reasons, very few companies developing complex products
in the information, technology, and communications area are able, as
a practical matter, to “clear” their products by entering into ex ante
licensing arrangements with most or all of the parties holding patents
that might later be asserted against their new products.61 For SEPs,
FRAND commitments seek to overcome these problems, but these
commitments do not specify royalty rates and even if they are
eﬀective, enforcing them involves substantial transaction costs.62
• Retaining Flexibility. Retaining ﬂexibility during the development
process so as to dodge possible infringement claims for the resulting
product can be exceedingly diﬃcult, especially given the large
number of patents and their vague boundaries. Further, even if such
ﬂexibility could be achieved, it might be very costly in terms of
reduced product performance or the need to deploy additional
engineering resources. That is especially true when the patent is an
SEP, since standardization is critical to many IT technologies.
Those, too, are ineﬃciencies, which can lead to elevated royalty rates
or cause other costs associated with mitigating patent holdup.
To summarize, each of the three basic mechanisms for mitigating patent
holdup—vertical integration, long-term contracts, and retaining ﬂexibility—
faces greater obstacles when it comes to patent holdup in the high-tech sector
than it does for more traditional types of holdup.
Reputational concerns also can mitigate holdup to some degree. However,
the reputation mechanism also performs relatively poorly in the context of
patent licensing for a number of reasons. It is difficult to identify the patents
that may be asserted against a new product. Licensing terms are typically kept

61 For a fuller discussion of this patent preclearance dynamic, see William F. Lee & A. Douglas
Melamed, Breaking the Vicious Cycle of Patent Damages, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 385, 404-09 (2016).
62 This highlights the beneﬁts of reducing those transaction costs, e.g., by clarifying the
circumstances under which SEP holders can obtain injunctions and the meaning of the term
“reasonable royalties.” See supra note 12.
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secret. Reputational effects may operate with a significant delay. A patent
holder’s incentives can change (as when an operating company fails and then
aggressively monetizes its patents). And patent owners can and do sell their
patents to Patent Assertion Entities (PAEs) to assert them aggressively.63 Plus,
for SEPs, the standard-setting process can make it difficult for SSO
participants to steer new standards clear of a firm that has behaved
opportunistically in the past if that firm makes a FRAND commitment to the
new standard. Reputation works only if you can avoid dealing with companies
that behave unreasonably; that may not be possible if they own SEPs.
The conclusion from this analysis is unambiguous: patent holdup is an
especially thorny subspecies of holdup, making it especially costly and
diﬃcult for ﬁrms developing new complex products to protect themselves
from patent holdup.
C. Actual Patent Holdups Are Very Diﬃcult to Measure
As with holdup in general, quantifying the frequency and magnitude of
actual patent holdups is very diﬃcult as a practical matter and not a useful
way of assessing the importance of the patent holdup problem. Rarely can
researchers observe the ex post price, because patent licensing terms are
normally conﬁdential. Even when researchers can observe the license fees,
they are often embedded in a complex agreement. And even in those rare
cases where researchers can accurately observe the ex post price, they are
unlikely to observe the ex ante price, making it diﬃcult if not impossible to
measure the magnitude of the holdup.
Litigated cases also are problematic as a source of data to quantify the
magnitude of actual patent holdups. A litigated case resulting in an award of
reasonable royalties may well involve attempted holdup, but by deﬁnition it
cannot provide smoking-gun evidence of actual holdup, at least if one accepts
that the royalties awarded by the court are reasonable.64 Rather, at least since
the Supreme Court eliminated the automatic entitlement to an injunction,
litigation to judgment (which is rare) often reﬂects a refusal to give in to
holdup by a defendant willing to take its chances in court. And the vast
63 Indeed, PAEs typically ﬁnd it valuable to develop a reputation for aggressively pursuing
patent infringement claims. Fiona Scott Morton & Carl Shapiro, Patent Assertions: Are We Any Closer
to Aligning Reward to Contribution?, in 16 INNOVATION POL’Y & ECON. 89, 91 (2016).
64 Two recent SEP cases provide good examples of this fact pattern. In Microsoft v. Motorola,
Judge Robart found that the reasonable royalties for Motorola’s SEPs were $1.8 million, a “tiny
fraction” of the $4 billion that Motorola was seeking. David J. Teece & Edward F. Sherry, A Public
Policy Evaluation of RAND Decisions in U.S. Courts, 1 CRITERION J. ON INNOVATION 113, 119 (2016).
In the Innovatio case, Judge Holderman found that the reasonable royalties were 9.56¢ per unit, a
tiny fraction of the $36 per unit demanded for a bar code scanner. In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC,
MDL No. 2303, 2013 WL 5593609 at *3, *12 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 3, 2013).
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majority of patent cases settle. The terms of a settlement are rarely
observable, so it is impossible to know whether those settlements reﬂected
the value of holdup.
Notwithstanding these points, a number of authors have pointed to a lack
of empirical evidence to argue that patent holdup either does not exist or is
not a signiﬁcant problem.65 Even taken on their own terms, many of these
papers are deeply ﬂawed. One such paper, which has often been cited by those
who downplay the importance of patent holdup, purports to oﬀer empirical
evidence inconsistent with the hypothesis that SEP holdup has slowed
innovation or harmed consumers.66 The conclusion to this Qualcomm-funded
paper states, “[w]e cannot reject the hypothesis of no SEP holdup.”67 How do
these authors reach this conclusion? They compare rates of change of qualityadjusted prices in “SEP-reliant” industries with “similar” non-SEP-reliant
industries, primarily over the 1997-2013 period.68 For example, they show that
quality-adjusted prices of cellular phones have fallen faster than the qualityadjusted prices of automobiles.69 This exercise does not address the relevant
hypothesis: whether SEP holdup increased the price of cellular phones from
what it otherwise would have been.70 The quality-adjusted prices of
65 See, e.g., Joshua D. Wright & Douglas H. Ginsburg, Comment on the Japan Fair Trade
Commission’s Draft Partial Amendment to the Guidelines for the Use of Intellectual Property Under
the Antimonopoly Act 3-7 (Aug. 3, 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/
public_statements/693631/150803japantradecomments.pdf [https://perma.cc/2XG9-7RFZ] (“There is
no empirical evidence that anticompetitive patent holdup is prevalent.”); see also Anne Layne-Farrar,
Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking Theory and Evidence: Where Do We Stand After 15 Years of History?,
at 2, DAF/COMP/WD(2014)84 (Nov. 18, 2014), http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/
publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=DAF/COMP/WD(2014)84&doclanguage=en [https://perma.cc/
5BCN-W979] (“[T]he empirical studies conducted thus far have not shown that holdup or royalty
stacking is a common problem in practice.”).
66 See Alexander Galetovic, Stephen Haber & Ross Levine, An Empirical Examination of Patent
Holdup, 11 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 549, 551-54 (2015) (ﬁnding no empirical support for the
notion that SEP holdup hypothesis has slowed innovation or harmed consumers).
67 Id. at 572.
68 Id. at 551-52. They also attempt to test for SEP holdup by asking whether the eBay decision
diﬀerentially aﬀected the rate of change of quality-adjusted prices in SEP-reliant industries and
non-SEP-reliant industries. Id. at 555. This test, too, has exceptionally low power, given the lags in
the system and the many other factors that aﬀect the rate of change of quality-adjusted prices. Worse
yet, the basic assumption behind the test—that eBay had a greater impact on SEPs than on other
types of patents—is highly questionable. More likely, eBay had a greater eﬀect on non-SEPs than on
SEPs. Prior to the eBay decision, FRAND commitments already limited the use of injunctions for
SEPs, while non-SEPs automatically received injunctions.
69 Id. at 564-66. The original version of this paper used the price of bananas as a “comparable”
benchmark. Alexander Galetovic, Stephen Haber & Ross Levine, Patent Holdup: Do Patent Holders Holdup
Innovation? 4 (Hoover Inst. Working Grp. on Intellectual Prop., Innovation, and Prosperity, No. 14011, 2014),
https://hooverip2.org/wp-content/uploads/ip2-wp14011-paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/TG7F-MSYA].
70 See Alexander Galetovic, Stephen Haber, & Ross Levine, An Empirical Examination of Patent
Hold-Up 9 (NBER Working Paper No. 21090, 2015), http://www.nber.org/papers/w21090
[https://perma.cc/99ZL-UN2M] (acknowledging that “the equilibrium outcome of the SEP hold-
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pharmaceuticals have risen much faster than automobiles over the same
period of time, but that similarly is not proof that pharmaceuticals are subject
to a patent holdup problem.
Beyond the obvious and fatal ﬂaws in this empirical work,71 the whole line
of inquiry is of limited relevance for the purpose of measuring the social costs
of holdup or designing institutions to limit patent holdup, because it only
looks for instances of actual patent holdup. As explained above, these
instances are very diﬃcult to detect and are only the tip of the iceberg in
terms of the social costs of patent holdup.72 So far as we can tell, the vast
majority of these papers have been funded by Qualcomm and other patent
holders seeking to weaken the institutions designed to control patent holdup,
increase their leverage in licensing negotiations, and thus increase their
ability to monetize their patents.73
up hypothesis is that consumers either face higher prices or lower quality products than they would
if hold-up was not taking place”).
71 More recent work fares no better. One recent paper claims to have counted up all the
royalties on phones worldwide and found that they amount to only 3% of the price of a phone.
Alexander Galetovic, Stephen Haber & Lew Zaretzki, An Estimate of the Average Cumulative Royalty
Yield in the World Mobile Phone Industry: Theory, Measurement and Results, 42 TELECOMM. POL’Y 263,
271-72 (2018). But the authors reach that conclusion only by ignoring the value of patents owned by
companies that make phones or phone components, which collectively own the largest number and
likely the most valuable patents. See Lemley & Melamed, supra note 9, at 2130 (noting that
“smartphone companies alone spent over $15 billion acquiring patents” over the course of a few
years). Even apart from that huge omission, their data are suspect, since later court evidence revealed
that just one company—Qualcomm—charged 3% across the board for its patents alone. FTC v.
Qualcomm Inc., 411 F. Supp. 3d 658, 673 (N.D. Cal. 2019).
72 See Thomas F. Cotter et al., Demystifying Patent Holdup, 76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1501, 154748 (2019) (noting that patent holdup can be a problem even if it isn’t systemic, and that “it may be
that case law imposing limits on the entry of injunctions is itself a leading factor constraining ﬁrms
from engaging in holdup”).
73 To be sure, companies on both sides have funded work in this area. But Qualcomm’s investment
has been extraordinary and has led to the creation of entire centers as well as funding scholarly papers.
See, e.g., Roger G. Brooks & Damien Geradin, Interpreting and Enforcing the Voluntary FRAND
Commitment 9 INT’L J. IT STANDARDS & STANDARDIZATION RES. 1 (2011) (acknowledging that the
author previously represented Qualcomm); Roger G. Brooks, Patent “Hold-Up,” Standards-Setting
Organizations and the FTC’s Campaign Against Innovators, 39 AIPLA Q.J. 435, 435 (2011) (acknowledging
that the author was representing Qualcomm in litigation pending when the article was written);
Damien Geradin, Anne Layne-Farrar & A. Jorge Padilla, The Complements Problem Within Standard
Setting: Assessing the Evidence On Royalty Stacking, 14 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 144, 144 (2008)
(acknowledging financial support from Qualcomm); Haksoo Ko, Facilitating Negotiation for Licensing
Standard-Essential Patents in the Shadow of Injunctive Relief Possibilities, 22 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 209,
209 (2014) (acknowledging financial support from Qualcomm); Anne Layne-Farrar, Gerard Llobet &
Jorge Padilla, Payments and Participation: The Incentives to Join Cooperative Standard Setting Efforts, 23 J.
ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 24, 24 (2014) (acknowledging financial support from Qualcomm); Anne
Layne-Farrar, Gerard Llobet & A. Jorge Padilla, Preventing Patent Hold Up: An Economic Assessment of
Ex Ante Licensing Negotiations in Standard Setting, 37 AIPLA Q.J. 445, 445 (2009) (acknowledging
financial support from Qualcomm); Anne Layne-Farrar, A. Jorge Padilla & Richard Schmalensee,
Pricing Patents for Licensing in Standard-Setting Organizations: Making Sense of FRAND Commitments, 74
ANTITRUST L.J. 671, 671 (2007) (acknowledging financial support from Qualcomm); About, HOOVER
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Despite the diﬃculties of observing the incidence and magnitude of actual
patent holdups, we are able to observe the telltale signs of actual patent
holdup. Transaction cost economics, and simple bargaining theory for that
matter, tell us that actual patent holdup can be expected to occur when three
conditions are present: (1) a ﬁrm has developed a new product independently;
(2) that ﬁrm has made signiﬁcant investments that are speciﬁc to one or more
patents asserted against that product; and (3) the ﬁrm is not protected from
patent holdup.74 As discussed above, conditions (1) and (2) are common in
the high-tech sector, placing considerable weight on the institutions that
protect ﬁrms from patent holdup.
The presence of those institutions is itself evidence that the patent holdup
problem is real and signiﬁcant. As we noted in Part I, companies try to
structure their transactions to avoid holdup, developing institutions for that
purpose. As we have seen, the traditional market solutions do not work well
for patents. In most industries, the central mechanisms limiting patent
holdup come from patent law, namely the rules governing injunctions and
patent damages. In the high-tech sector, companies have overwhelmingly
turned to SSOs in an eﬀort to obtain global commitments to an ex ante
royalty, which appear in the form of FRAND commitments. The nearuniversal recognition in the industry of the need for such a mechanism is
strong evidence that companies view holdup as a problem they must build
institutions to avoid.

IP2, https://hooverip2.org/about/ [https://perma.cc/7U7Y-4H8W] (last visited May 20, 2020)
(acknowledging financial support from Qualcomm); Qualcomm Gives $2 Million for Patent Research, NW.
PRITZKER SCH. L. (Aug. 2013), https://www.law.northwestern.edu/campaign/gifts/qualcomm/
index.html [https://perma.cc/R8XL-ZGTL] (explaining that Qualcomm gave at $2 million gift “to
establish the Project on Innovation Economics, research that will investigate the role of patents in
incentivizing technological innovation); Supporters, CTR. FOR THE PROTECTION OF INTELL. PROP.
https://cpip.gmu.edu/about/supporters/ [https://perma.cc/6ZL5-C7E2] (last visited May 20, 2020)
(acknowledging financial support from Qualcomm); Leading US Technology Firm Substantially Invests in
World-Class Fundamental Research at TILEC, TILEC NEWS (Apr. 26, 2007),
https://uvtapp.uvt.nl/tsb11/nb.nb_lib.frmtoonnieuwsbrief?v_nieuwsbrief_id=10764&v_rubriek_id=0&
v_taal= [https://perma.cc/2ET3-CDAK] (acknowledging Qualcomm support); U.S. Telecom Firm
Boosts Research Funds at Tilburg University Law and Economics Center Beneficiary, GO DUTCH,
http://www.godutch.com/newspaper/index.php?id=1181 [https://perma.cc/V3YF-J6HM] (last visited
June 2, 2020) (“Research Center TILEC, the Tilburg Law and Economics Center, has received almost
€300,000 from American telecom company Qualcomm.”).
74 As explained above, actual patent holdup also can be expected to occur even without
“ambush” when a ﬁrm is anticipating making speciﬁc investments and cannot easily identify the
patents that may be asserted against its new products or when the identiﬁed patents are relatively
weak. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
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D. FRAND Commitments for Standard-Essential Patents
The danger of patent holdup is particularly high for SEPs that read on
popular industry standards. The reason is not hard to see: the patents are by
deﬁnition thought to be essential to work in the ﬁeld.75 If compliance with a
standard is essential to market success, as it often is in network markets, a
company has no choice but to invest in assets that might later turn out to be
subject to SEPs. Further, there is unambiguous evidence of substantial patent
thickets for many patent standards, as measured by the number of declared
SEPs for those standards.76
Precisely because patent holdup is such a grave problem for SEPs, SSOs
commonly, if not uniformly, require that participants agree to license any
SEPs on FRAND terms.77 Indeed, the FRAND commitment itself
developed as a response to anticompetitive conduct by patent owners that
failed to disclose their claim to own rights in a standard and then demanded
excessive royalties after the standard-setting organization was locked in.78
There is a broad consensus that the primary purpose of these FRAND
commitments is to prevent SEP holdup by ensuring that parties seeking to
make, use, or sell products that comply with the standard are able to do so,
provided they pay reasonable royalties for the required SEPs.79
75 Whether they actually are essential is open to some debate. See Mark A. Lemley & Timothy
Simcoe, How Essential Are Standard-Essential Patents?, 104 CORNELL L. REV. 607, 628-32 (2019)
(“When SEPs are asserted in court, most of them turn out not to be infringed.”).
76 See Brad Biddle, Andrew White & Sean Woods, How Many Standards in a Laptop? (And Other
Empirical Questions) PROC. 2010 ITU-T KALEIDOSCOPE ACAD. CONF. 123, 123 (2010) (“identif[ying]
251 technical interoperability standards implemented in a modern laptop”); Lemley & Shapiro, A Simple
Approach, supra note 16, at 1158 (noting the thousands of patents claimed to be essential to smartphone
technology); Ann Armstrong, Joseph J. Mueller & Timothy D. Syrett, The Smartphone Royalty Stack:
Surveying Royalty Demand for the Components Within Modern Smartphones 7 (May 29, 2014) (unpublished
manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2443848 [https://perma.cc/K2DEPA64] (“[O]ne estimate suggests that there are 250,000 current patents relevant to the modern
smartphone.”).
77 Much has been written about these FRAND policies. For a ﬁne review, see generally Jorge
L. Contreras, Technical Standards, Standards-Setting Organizations, and Intellectual Property: A Survey
of the Literature (with an Emphasis on Empirical Approaches), in 2 RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE
ECONOMICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (Peter Menell & David Schwartz eds., 2019).
78 See Jorge L. Contreras, A Brief History of FRAND: Analyzing Current Debates in Standard
Setting and Antitrust Through a Historical Lens, 80 ANTITRUST L.J. 39, 42-44, 64-66 (2015) (“In
response to the perceived threat of patent hold-up, many [standards-development organizations]
have adopted formal policies that impose one or both of the following obligations on participants:
(1) an obligation to disclose patents essential to implementation of a standard, and/or (2) an
obligation to license such patents on FRAND terms.”).
79 See Norman Siebrasse & Thomas F. Cotter, Judicially Determined FRAND Royalties, in THE
CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF TECHNICAL STANDARDIZATION LAW (Jorge L. Contreas, ed., 2017);
Thomas F. Cotter, Patent Holdup, Patent Remedies, and Antitrust Responses, 34 J. CORP. L. 1151, 1201
(2009) (“SSOs have experimented with or considered various policies designed to minimize the risk
of patent holdup . . . . [such as] requiring SSO members/patent owners to commit to licensing their
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The widespread requirement that owners of SEPs commit to licensing
them on FRAND terms is an application of the general theory of holdup.
Firms developing products that will comply with an industry standard
typically need to make very substantial investments that are speciﬁc to these
SEPs. This makes SEP holdup an obvious danger. The general theory of
holdup teaches us that market participants will migrate towards the most
eﬃcient way of avoiding or mitigating SEP holdup. What are their choices?
Vertical integration cannot solve the SEP holdup problem, since the whole
idea of standard setting is to enable many downstream firms to make compliant
products, which requires practicing SEPs.80 For a standard to work, every firm
needs access to every SEP; they cannot simply vertically integrate with some of
the SEPs that read on that standard. Nor can product design flexibility solve
the SEP holdup problem because a compliant product will infringe SEPs by
definition.81 The best hope for dealing with SEP holdup is to rely on disclosure
of SEPs together with some type of ex ante long-term contract.
Enter FRAND commitments: promises made by all participants in a
standards body that they will license all essential patents on “fair, reasonable,
and nondiscriminatory terms.” Those ubiquitous commitments are evidence
of an entire industry trying to protect itself from patent holdup.
However, because FRAND commitments require collective action, and
because SSOs typically operate on the basis of consensus, they are subject to
their own substantial imperfections and transaction costs. In particular, the
FRAND commitments called for by most SSOs are surprisingly vague given
their critical role in limiting SEP holdup. The most common provision
simply requires that SEP holders make irrevocable commitments to license
their SEPs on reasonable and non-discriminatory terms, but does nothing to
specify or limit those terms.82 Despite these obstacles, FRAND
commitments can be made more explicit and more eﬀective at preventing
technology, if at all, on RAND terms.”); Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and StandardSetting Organizations, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1889, 1924-25 (2002) [hereinafter Lemley, Intellectual
Property Rights] (“If an IP owner agrees to license its patents that cover a standard on reasonable and
nondiscriminatory terms, others will assume that they are free to use that standard so long as they
pay a reasonable royalty.”).
80 Vertical integration can work to some degree, e.g., if a large downstream firm acquires a
collection of SEPs. But other downstream firms would still need access to those SEPs on reasonable
terms. A group of downstream firms could acquire a collection of SEPs, but again other downstream
firms would still need access to those SEPs. Patent pools can help mitigate the SEP holdup problem,
but downstream firms who are not pool members still need access to those SEPs on reasonable terms.
81 Flexibility can help in some circumstances, e.g. by making certain aspects of the standard
optional rather than mandatory, thereby reducing the number of SEPs. But mandatory elements are
typically critical for an interoperability standard to work properly, and as a factual matter many
SEPs read on these mandatory elements.
82 For a survey of standard-setting organization rules relating to IP, see Lemley, Intellectual
Property Rights, supra note 79.
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SEP holdup, as exempliﬁed by the recent salutary changes at the IEEE.83
However, in this paper we simply take as given existing SSO policies,
vagueness and all. For our purposes here, the key point is that these FRAND
commitments are the central mechanism used by SSOs to address the
problem of SEP holdup. We can apply the general theory of holdup to ask
how well these FRAND commitments work to mitigate holdup. We also can
apply the general theory of holdup to help us understand the economic
eﬀects, and formulate the best policy responses, when SEP owners breach
their FRAND commitments. But the very fact that those commitments are
ubiquitous is itself evidence of an entire industry seeking to mitigate a
widespread holdup problem.
Fortunately, United States courts have come to understand the critical
role played by FRAND commitments in mitigating SEP holdup. Most
notably, the Federal Circuit has explicitly found that the concept of
reasonable royalties, as applied to SEPs, means the royalties that would be
negotiated prior to the establishment of the standard rather than transferring
to the patent owner the value of collective adoption of the standard.84 In
addition, the Federal Circuit, applying eBay, has indicated that injunctions
will normally not be available for SEPs: “[a] patentee subject to FRAND
commitments may have diﬃculty establishing irreparable harm.”85 The Ninth
Circuit has taken the same position.86 Nothing in these decisions prevents
SEP owners from properly protecting themselves from non-paying users,but
they do give force to the contractual mechanisms companies use to try to
83 See IEEE-SA STANDARDS BOARD BYLAWS , supra note 12, at 4 (requiring all proposed
IEEE standards to be accompanied by an assurance that any SEPs would be available for a
reasonable royalty). Importantly, the IEEE rules also provide a mechanism for SEP owners to
control holdout by patent users who refuse to pay reasonable royalties. Id.
84 See Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc., 773 F.3d 1201, 1232 (Fed. Cir. 2014). The Federal
Circuit laid out two “special” considerations for “dealing with SEPs.” Id. “First, the patented feature
must be apportioned from all of the unpatented features reﬂected in the standard. Second, the
patentee’s royalty must be premised on the value of the patented feature, not any value added
by the standard’s adoption of the patented technology.” Id. As the Federal Circuit noted, “[t]hese
steps are necessary to ensure that the royalty award is based on the incremental value that the
patented invention adds to the product, not any value added by the standardization of that
technology.” Id. (emphasis in original).
85 Apple Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 757 F.3d 1286, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2014). The Federal Circuit left
open the possibility that an injunction may be warranted if the infringer refuses to pay a FRAND
royalty. See Lemley & Shapiro, A Simple Approach, supra note 16, at 1144 (“The standard-essential
patent owner may seek an injunction against an unwilling licensee.”).
86 ”Implicit in such a sweeping promise is, at least arguably, a guarantee that the patent-holder
will not take steps to keep would-be users from using the patented material, such as seeking an
injunction, but will instead proﬀer licenses consistent with the commitment made.” Microsoft Corp.
v. Motorola, Inc., 696 F.3d 872, 884 (9th Cir. 2012). “Motorola, in its declarations to the ITU,
promised to ‘grant a license to an unrestricted number of applicants on a worldwide, nondiscriminatory basis and on reasonable terms and conditions to use the patented material necessary’
to practice the ITU standards.” Id.
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avoid holdup and replicate what a negotiation might look like absent
irreversible investments.
Another signiﬁcant step to avoiding holdup was the Supreme Court’s
decision in eBay v. MercExchange that successful patent holders were not
automatically entitled to an injunction.87 Following eBay, the lower courts
have generally ruled that non-practicing entities are normally entitled to
reasonable royalties but not permanent injunctions because their interest is
only in a reasonable license fee.88 While eBay did not eliminate the danger of
patent holdup, it greatly reduced the scope of patent holdup, at least by nonpracticing entities. If a court will not grant an injunction, patent holdup is
unlikely so long as reasonable royalties are calculated correctly.
From the perspective of transaction cost economics, eBay was a huge step
forward. The eBay case established a bundle of rights for patent owners that
promotes innovation by balancing the twin goals of (1) rewarding invention by
patent holders through suitable patent remedies, and (2) encouraging
subsequent innovation and commercialization by reducing patent holdup. The
Supreme Court’s ruling in eBay, coupled with the appellate court’s rulings on
damages, have substantially reduced the danger of SEP holdup in
conventional patent infringement actions by aligning the patentee’s remedies
with the intrinsic value of its invention rather than allowing it to lay claim to
the value of standardization itself.89 Unfortunately, however, these limitations
on injunctions for SEPs do not apply to exclusion orders granted by the
International Trade Commission (ITC). The ITC has the authority to sharply
limit exclusion orders for SEPs if they are not in the public interest, but so far
the ITC has not done so, despite urgings from the Department of Justice and
the USPTO during the Obama Administration. In one highly visible case, the
U.S. Trade Representative vetoed an ITC exclusion order for an SEP.90
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 394 (2006).
See Christopher B. Seaman, Permanent Injunctions in Patent Litigation After eBay: An
Empirical Study, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1949, 1953 (“[D]istrict courts appear to have adopted a de facto
rule against injunctive relief for [patent assertion entities] and other patent owners who do not
directly compete in a product market against an infringer . . . .”); Kirti Gupta & Jay P. Kesan,
Studying the Impact of eBay on Injunctive Relief in Patent Cases 1-2 (July 11, 2015) (unpublished
manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2629399 [https://perma.cc/M5F93ZEZ] (“[D]istrict courts [have] consistently denied permanent injunctions . . . in instances when
the patent holder and the infringer are not direct competitors in a product market.”).
89 The remaining prospect for holdup in these cases stems primarily from the possibility that
the patent infringement damages awarded by the court will exceed the level of reasonable royalties.
How often this happens, and why, is beyond the scope of this paper.
90 See Froman, supra note 10; cf. Certain Electronic Devices, Including Wireless
Communication Devices, Portable Music and Data Processing Devices, and Tablet Computers, Inv.
No. 337-TA-794, USITC (June 4, 2013) (Final) (setting forth the original, vetoed exclusion order).
For a discussion of ITC remedies involving SEPs, see Colleen V. Chien & Mark A. Lemley, Patent
Holdup, the ITC, and the Public Interest, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 41-43 (2012).
87
88
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E. The Patent Holdout Chimera
Patent advocates have sought to deﬂect concerns about patent holdup not
only by denying its existence but by concocting a supposedly parallel story of
“patent holdout.” On this theory, patent owners are being deprived of the
fruits of their R&D investments by implementers who copy their technology
but refuse to pay. The idea is to tell a story that parallels patent holdup.91
Patent holdout is incoherent as a theoretical matter and rejected as an
empirical matter. Empirically, between 95% and 99% of patent defendants in
the IT industry are not in fact copying anything.92 They are independent
inventors.93 Indeed, as we have seen, it is quite often impossible to know
whether someone else invented the same thing you did at around the same
time until years after the fact. Coupled with the notorious vagueness of IT
patents94 and the sheer number of them, patent holdout does not explain what
goes on in the technology industry unless it means failing to predict which of
500,000 patents, many of which you cannot see, will someday be asserted
against technology you have developed yourself even though you have never
heard of the inventor and they never built anything. That is not to say that
there are never cases of deliberate copying, but they are a tiny fraction of
patent suits in the IT industry.
The problems with patent holdout run far deeper than that, however.
According to the patent holdout theory, the patent holder is unfairly
disadvantaged because it has incurred the sunk costs of developing its
invention before it can negotiate with an alleged infringer. But this is
precisely how innovation in the private sector is intended to work in the
presence of a patent system. The reward to an inventor is based on the
incremental value of its invention, not on the amount of money expended to
achieve that invention or the risk involved.95 A major invention can earn
enormous proﬁts even if it did not involve large R&D expenditures, and a
patented invention may have no commercial value, even if it was very
expensive to develop.
91 See, e.g., Luke Froeb & Mikhael Shor, Innovators, Implementers, and Two-Sided Hold-Up,
ANTITRUST SOURCE, Aug. 2015, at 2 (“Just as implementers invest before knowing what endproduct demand will be, so too must innovators invest before knowing whether an innovation will
be implemented.”). The authors consult on these issues for Ericsson, the owner of many SEPs.
92 Cotropia & Lemley, supra note 51, at 1445-46.
93 For a discussion of the prevalence of independent invention, see Mark A. Lemley, The Myth
of the Sole Inventor, 110 MICH. L. REV. 709, 712-35 (2012); see also Carl Shapiro, Prior User Rights, 96
INTELL. PROP. LITIG. & INNOVATION 92, 92 (2006)
94 See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 53, at 54 (“Patent law often fails to provide good notice
to innovators about the patent rights relevant to adoption of a new technology.”).
95 Diﬀerent systems are used in some circumstances. For example, the government can oﬀer a
prize for the ﬁrst party to achieve a certain goal, or the government can directly fund private research
or development eﬀorts.
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Those who express concerns about patent holdout seem to want to
increase the returns to patent holders whose inventions add little or no
incremental value. That’s simply not how the patent system works or is
intended to work. Indeed, doing so would create perverse incentives for
companies to seek patents with holdup power rather than to fund R&D
programs leading to technological advances.
The patent holdout theory boils down to a complaint that basing patent
damages on reasonable royalties is not favorable enough to patent holders; that
they should be entitled to capture all the social value that traces in some way to
their technology.96 But no property gives its owner the right to all related social
surplus, and no market works that way. On top of all that, the patent holdout
view seems rooted in the stilted view that all innovation comes in the form of
patents. That proposition is disproven by a large literature and impressive body
of evidence showing that a great deal of the creation, adoption, and diffusion
of new technologies does not take place in the form of patents.97
Those pushing the theory of patent holdout as parallel to patent holdup
also misunderstand the actual operation of the patent system. Patent holdup,
like any kind of holdup, occurs because the party engaging in patent holdup,
namely the patent owner, has the law on its side and can therefore shut down
the defendant’s conduct unless the defendant pays a surcharge. But there is no
similar legal right of the party supposedly engaging in patent holdout to
infringe a patent. To the contrary, the law gives patent owners the right to sue
for an injunction (if they are practicing entities) and, in any event, for damages
adequate to compensate for the infringement.98 While courts may have
difficulty calculating those damages, they tend to err on the side of paying
patent owners too much, not too little.99 Plus, a defendant deliberately

96 See Einer Elhauge, Do Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking Lead to Systematically Excessive
Royalties?, 4 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 535, 541-45 (2008) (making this assumption).
97 See, e.g., Richard C. Levin, Alvin K. Klevorick, Richard R. Nelson & Sidney G. Winter,
Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research and Development, 3 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON.
ACTIVITY, 783, 784, 793-96 (1987) (noting that certain industries primarily rely on non-patent means of
appropriating returns); Wesley M. Cohen, Richard R. Nelson & John P. Walsh, Protecting Their Intellectual
Assets: Appropriability Conditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not) 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 7552, 2000),
https://www.nber.org/papers/w7552.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9RGS-9LYT] (finding that firms leverage their inventions via “secrecy, lead time
advantages, and the use of complementary marketing and manufacturing capabilities”). See generally 1-2
HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF INNOVATION, (Bronwyn H. Hall & Nathan Rosenberg eds., 2010).
98 35 U.S.C. §§ 283, 284 (2018) (empowering courts to “grant injunctions in accordance with
the principles of equity” and to award “damages adequate to compensate for . . . infringement”).
99 See Mark A. Lemley, Distinguishing Lost Profits From Reasonable Royalties, 51 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 655, 656 (2009) (“[C]ourts have . . . artiﬁcially rais[ed] the reasonable royalty rate . . . in an
eﬀort to compensate patent owners.”); Brian J. Love, Note, Patentee Overcompensation and the Entire
Market Value Rule, 60 STAN. L. REV. 263, 265 (2010) (“[Courts’] application of the entire market
rule routinely overcompensates patentees.”).
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infringing a patent must also pay punitive damages for willful infringement,100
and often attorneys’ fees as well.101 Some companies may try to “hold out” by
infringing a patent and refusing to pay reasonable royalties, but the law can
and does call them to account for it. Patent holdout might be a worry if we did
not have a patent system, but that system by design prevents patent holdout.102
It is true that a group of companies might conspire together to drive down
the price of inputs, just as they might form a cartel to raise their own prices.
These “buyers’ cartels” are a legitimate worry of antitrust law.103 But a single
company developing a product it made and defending itself in a later patent
suit is not a buyers’ cartel. Nor is a group of companies that responds to the
danger of patent holdup, not by refusing to pay or by setting an artiﬁcially
low price, but by agreeing with the patent owners themselves to pay the price
patent law would rightfully charge them anyway—a FRAND royalty.
F. Summary
So far, we have established the following propositions:
•

•

•

The theory of holdup predicts that the danger of holdup will be
greatest for transactions involving large, speciﬁc investments, and
that market participants will structure their aﬀairs to minimize the
costs associated with holdup, including mitigation costs.
The general theory of holdup has extensive empirical support in the
academic literature. This empirical support comes primarily from
observing situations in which market participants structure their
relationships to mitigate the ineﬃciencies resulting from holdup.
Looking for the presence or absence of actual holdups in speciﬁc
settings is not an eﬀective way to test the theory of holdup. There
may be little or no actual holdup in a given situation because market
participants have eﬀectively adopted strategies to mitigate or
eliminate holdup. Furthermore, researchers usually lack the data
necessary to quantify actual holdup, even when it occurs.

100 See Halo Elecs. v. Pulse Elecs., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1932-34 (2016) (“[Punitive damages] should
generally be reserved for egregious cases typiﬁed by willful misconduct.”).
101 See Octane Fitness v. Icon Health & Fitness, 572 U.S. 545, 552 (2014) (explaining that
attorneys’ fees are awarded in “exceptional” cases). As both Contreras and Cotter et. al. note, holdout
essentially resolves to “willful patent infringement” the law already punishes. Contreras infra note
136, at 895; Cotter et al. supra note 72, at 1551.
102 True, patent litigation is expensive, and that makes litigation less attractive, particularly if
the stakes are small. But that’s true for both plaintiﬀs and defendants.
103 2 HERBERT HOVENKAMP ET AL., IP AND ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST
PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW, §35.06 (3d ed. 2019). For an example
of such a cartel, see Jones Knitting Corp. v. Morgan, 361 F.2d 451, 452, 459 (3d Cir. 1966).
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•

The conditions under which holdup is a danger apply with unusual
force to patent holdup. The primary mechanisms market participants
normally employ to mitigate holdup do not work well to mitigate
patent holdup, especially in the information technology and
telecommunications sector.
• Holdup based on SEPs is an especially grave danger, due to the large
number of declared SEPs and the magnitude of the investments that
are specific to making products that comply with popular industry
standards. Industry participants, well aware of this danger, generally
require SEP owners to make FRAND commitments to mitigate the
risk of SEP holdup. Injunctions are generally inconsistent with
those commitments.104 The Supreme Court’s eBay decision, by
limiting the availability of permanent injunctions, reduced the
danger of patent holdup.
• So-called patent holdout—by which people usually mean “patent
infringement”—is adequately addressed by patent law and is in no
way comparable to patent holdup.
All of this implies and conﬁrms that FRAND commitments play a major
role in limiting SEP holdup. Eﬀorts to make those commitments more
eﬀective should be welcomed so long as SEP owners are able to receive the
reasonable royalties to which they are entitled.
III. THE ROLE OF ANTITRUST IN POLICING HOLDUP
A. Standard-Setting Organizations Have Long Been Recognized as
Procompetitive
Standard-setting organizations naturally raise antitrust issues, as they
involve agreements among competitors aﬀecting the manner in which they
compete. Eﬀorts by incumbent ﬁrms to use safety and performance standards
to exclude new technologies were struck down by the Supreme Court in the
1980s as violations of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, and properly so.105
104 See Dan L. Burk, Punitive Patent Liability: A Comparative Examination, 37 REV. LITIG. 327,
333, 338-39 (2018) (voicing concerns about a “bait-and-switch on the part of the patent holder who
promised non-exclusive fair and reasonable terms but later demands injunctive exclusivity”);
Michael A. Carrier, Why Property Law Does Not Support the Antitrust Abandonment of Standards, 57
HOUS. L. REV. 265, 274 (2019) (praising courts for recognizing that injunctions involving SEPs
should be issued with care).
105 See Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc. 486 U.S. 492, 495-97, 501 (1988)
(refusing to provide Noerr-Pennington immunity to ﬁrm that manipulated voting in SSO to shut out
new manufacturer); Am. Soc’y of Mech. Eng’rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 559-64
(1982) (holding SSO liable after it set forth a standards interpretation designed to shut out new
manufacturer).
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Antitrust attention has shifted to compatibility standards during the past
twenty years as the importance of standard-setting in the high-tech sector has
grown. The antitrust and scholarly consensus recognizes two important ways
in which compatibility standards promote competition and beneﬁt
consumers.106 First, compatibility standards can give consumers the low
prices, enhanced variety, and improved quality that result from competition,
together with the large positive network eﬀects associated with assured
compatibility. A phone that can communicate with other phones is much
more valuable than one that can’t, and a device that can access the Internet
anywhere is much more valuable than one tethered to a particular company’s
version of WiFi. As a consequence, SSO activities in furtherance of these
goals should be evaluated using the rule of reason, not subject to per se liability
under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
Second, SSOs can promote the adoption of new technology by limiting
patent holdup. As a consequence, SSO eﬀorts to establish eﬀective rules
requiring SEP owners to license their SEPs on FRAND terms to all parties
seeking to make or sell compliant devices promote innovation and are procompetitive. Indeed, it is breaches of these rules that can harm competition
and consumers.107 This consensus reﬂects economic research relating to
standard-setting, network eﬀects, and innovation. The implication is not that
compatibility SSOs are never problematic, but rather that setting standards
and enforcing reasonable patent policies related to those standards promotes
rather than impedes competition.108
This consensus can be seen in numerous policy statements and
enforcement actions by the FTC and the DOJ over the years.109 As one
106 See Mark A. Lemley, Antitrust and the Internet Standardization Problem, 28 CONN. L. REV.
1041, 1081 (1996) (discussing the beneﬁts of compatibility standards).
107 Lemley, Ten Things, supra note 15, at 156-58, 161. To serve this function, the “reasonable” in
FRAND must refer to the reasonable royalties before the standard is established. Id. at 158. As
discussed above, patent law moved decisively in this direction over the same time period.
108 Indeed, Melamed and Shapiro have argued that joint standard setting without such policies
may itself be anticompetitive. See Carl Shapiro & A. Douglas Melamed, How Antitrust Law Can
Make FRAND Commitments More Eﬀective, 127 YALE L.J. 2110 (2018).
109 See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 1 at 194 (“A deﬁnition of RAND based on the
ex ante value of the patented technology at the time the standard is set is necessary for consumers
to beneﬁt from competition among technologies to be incorporated into the standard . . . .”); U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 1 at 37 (“In light of these potential
procompetitive beneﬁts, the [DOJ and FTC] would generally expect to apply the rule of reason to
evaluate conduct such as multilateral ex ante licensing negotiations or SSO requirements to disclose
model licensing terms.”); Deborah Platt Majoras, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Recognizing the
Procompetitive Potential of Royalty Discussions in Standard Setting, Prepared Remarks at
Standardization and the Law: Developing the Golden Mean for Global Trade at Stanford University
7 (Sept. 23, 2005), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/ﬁles/documents/public_statements/
recognizing-procompetitive-potential-royalty-discussions-standard-setting/050923stanford.pdf
[https://perma.cc/S6TP-D7SX] (“[J]oint ex ante royalty discussions that are reasonably necessary
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example, in 2006, the Antitrust Modernization Commission(AMC) made the
following recommendation: “Joint negotiations with intellectual property
owners by members of a standard-setting organization with respect to
royalties prior to the establishment of the standard, without more, should be
evaluated under the rule of reason.”110 Antitrust and patent agencies have
followed this principle for many years.111 Notably, then-Commissioner Makan
Delrahim, who now leads the Antitrust Division, dissented from the
statement allowing ex ante royalty negotiations with the DVD standard.112
B. The Trump Administration Reverses Course
Under Assistant Attorney General Delrahim, the Antitrust Division has
reversed course, dramatically changing its approach to SEPs and FRAND
commitments. Some policy changes announced by the Antitrust Division
weaken antitrust enforcement and thus make it easier for SEP holders to
engage in patent holdup. Others threaten to use antitrust oﬀensively to
discourage market participants from protecting themselves from patent
holdup. The FTC has not changed its policies, so there is now a yawning gap
between the DOJ and the FTC on these issues.113

to avoid hold up do not warrant per se condemnation. Rather, they merit the balancing undertaken
in a rule of reason review.”).
110 ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM’N, ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMMISSION
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 13 (2007), https://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/
report_recommendation/amc_final_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/HFC4-LB67].
111 See supra note 109; Letter from Charles A. James, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
to Ky P. Ewing, Vinson & Elkins 8, 13 (Nov. 12, 2002), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/ﬁles
/atr/legacy/2006/04/27/200455.pdf [https://perma.cc/YAU5-GRPZ] (allowing ex ante royalty
negotiation with 3GPP standard); Letter from Joel I. Klein, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t
of Justice, to Gerrard R. Beeny, Esquire, Sullivan & Cromwell 11 (June 26, 1997),
https://www.justice.gov/archive/atr/public/busreview/215742.pdf [https://perma.cc/9U8D-SVUH]
(same with MPEG-2 standard); Letter from Joel I. Klein, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, to Gerrard R. Beeny, Esquire, Sullivan & Cromwell 13 (Dec. 16, 1998),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/ﬁles/atr/legacy/2006/04/27/2121.pdf [https://perma.cc/A7HMG6XN] (same with DVD standard).
112 ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM’N, supra note 110, at 407-09 (separate statement of
Commissioner Delrahim). He also criticized the DOJ Business Review Letter to VITA because the
Antitrust Division did not object to the VITA policy requiring SEP holders to disclose the
maximum royalty rates they would charge for their SEPs. Id. at 409.
113 See Brief for the United States of America as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellant and Vacatur, Fed.
Trade Comm’n v. Qualcomm Inc., 935 F.3d 752 (2019) (No. 19-16122), 2019 WL 3977818 (opposing the FTC’s
enforcement action against Qualcomm); Joseph Simons, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Prepared Remarks
at the Georgetown Law Global Antitrust Enforcement Symposium 6 (Sept. 25, 2018),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/1413340/simons_georgetown_lunch_address_
9-25-18.pdf [https://perma.cc/PLQ4-LCF3] (acknowledging this gap and noting that “the FTC will continue
our economically grounded and fact-based enforcement of the antitrust laws in [the standard-setting
process]”).
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The policy changes at the DOJ have been announced and communicated
in a series of speeches given by Assistant Attorney General Delrahim starting
in November 2017, shortly after he took oﬃce. His ﬁrst speech addressing
this topic is illustrative.114 That speech begins with his assertion that “The
Hold-Out Problem Poses a More Serious Threat to Innovation than the
Hold-Up Problem,”115 a claim we debunked above. He goes on to state ﬂatly
that “Antitrust Law Should Not Police FRAND Commitments to SSOs.”116
In fact, however, the Division’s current policy contemplates antitrust
intervention in standard-setting—but, shockingly, on the side of those who
seek to avoid their FRAND commitments and engage in holdup.
Based on a deeply misguided view of how technology competition works
and the way in which the patent system functions, the Antitrust Division has
put forward antitrust policies designed to favor SEP holders at the expense of
other market participants, innovation, and, ultimately, consumers. The
Division also has taken a number of actions to implement these policy changes.
• The Antitrust Division sent a letter to the American National
Standards Institute (ANSI) in March 2018 stating that “the Antitrust
Division will . . . [therefore] be skeptical of rules that SSOs impose
that appear designed speciﬁcally to shift bargaining leverage from IP
creators to implementers, or vice versa.”117 This direct attack on SSO
rules requiring FRAND commitments is explicitly based on the
ﬂawed patent holdout theory.
• In December 2018, the DOJ withdrew from the joint DOJ/PTO
policy position regarding SEPs and FRAND commitments,118 based
in part on the following peculiar assertion by Delrahim: “A FRAND

114 See Makan Delrahim, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Take It to the Limit:
Respecting Innovation Incentives in the Application of Antitrust Law, Prepared Remarks at
University of Southern California Gould School of Law (Nov. 10, 2017),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/ﬁle/1010746/download
[https://perma.cc/9B7L-XSFC]
[hereinafter Delrahim, Take It to the Limit].
115 Id. at 3.
116 Id. at 7.
117 Letter from Andrew C. Finch, Oﬃce of the Principal Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S.
Dep’t of Justice, to Patricia Griﬃn, Vice President & Gen. Counsel, & Amy Marasco, Chair, Am.
Nat’l Standards Institute 1 (Mar. 7, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/atr/page/ﬁle/1043456/download
[https://perma.cc/4ZJX-HVFJ] (quoting Delrahim, Take It to the Limit, supra note 114).
118 Makan Delrahim, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, “Telegraph Road”:
Incentivizing Innovation at the Intersection of Patent and Antitrust Law, Prepared Remarks at the
19th Annual Berkeley-Stanford Advanced Patent Law Institute 7 (Dec. 7, 2018),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/ﬁle/1117686/download [https://perma.cc/HAK3-4VXV].
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commitment does not and should not create a compulsory license
scheme.”119 In December 2019, it persuaded the PTO to do the same.120
• In September 2020, the DOJ reversed its prior approval of the IEEE’s
patent policies that established standards for setting a FRAND royalty.
The new letter suggests that an SSO may violate the antitrust laws even
if it establishes clear rules for determining what a FRAND royalty is, or
requires a party to actually commit to a FRAND license and give up
injunctive relief.121
• Perhaps most notably, the DOJ has ﬁled briefs attacking its sister
antitrust agency, the Federal Trade Commission, for enforcing the
antitrust laws against Qualcomm.122
Together, these actions reﬂect a remarkable policy shift at the Antitrust
Division, not only abandoning enforcement of the antitrust laws against SEP
owners but also imposing antitrust risk on SSOs that enforce FRAND
commitments or other policies designed to limit SEP holdup.
There are two prongs to this attack. First, the Antitrust Division now takes
the position that antitrust should not be used to control the monopoly power
associated with SEPs by limiting patent holdup. According to Delrahim,
“[f]irst, hold-up is fundamentally not an antitrust problem, and therefore
antitrust law should not be used as a tool to police FRAND commitments that
patent-holders make to standard setting organizations.”123 According to the
Antitrust Division, even a SEP holder that gains a monopoly through
deception at the SSO and subsequently exerts its monopoly power by
breaching its FRAND commitment has not violated the Sherman Act.124
Id. at 6.
See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE & NAT’L INST. OF
STANDARDS & TECH., POLICY STATEMENT ON REMEDIES FOR STANDARDS-ESSENTIAL
PATENTS SUBJECT TO VOLUNTARY F/RAND COMMITMENTS 3-4 (2019).
121 Letter from Makan Delrahim, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just., Antitrust Div., to
Sophia A. Muirhead, Gen. Couns. & Chief Compliance Oﬀ., Inst. Of Elec. & Elecs. Eng’rs, Inc.
(Sept. 10, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/atr/page/ﬁle/1315291/download [https://perma.cc/
LJ3B-2WZP].
122 Brief for the United States of America as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellant and Vacatur,
FTC v. Qualcomm Inc., 935 F.3d 752 (2019) (No. 19-16122), 2019 WL 3977818.
123 Makan Delrahim, Assistant Att’y Gen., The “New Madison” Approach to Antitrust and
Intellectual Property Law, Prepared Remarks at the University of Pennsylvania Law School 5 (Mar.
16, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/ﬁle/1044316/download [https://perma.cc/Y2EZEGCT] [hereinafter Delrahim, “New Madison”].
124 Statement of Interest of the United States at 1-2, 7, 11-20, Cont’l Auto. Sys., Inc. v. Avanci
LLC, No. 3:19-CV-02933-M (N.D. Tex. May 10, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/atr/casedocument/ﬁle/1253361/download [https://perma.cc/AKK6-2J79]. This amicus brief explicitly rejects
the approach taken in Broadcom v. Qualcomm, 501 F. 3d 297 (3d Cir. 2007), under which obtaining a
SEP monopoly by deception can violate the Sherman Act. Id. at 8. This brief is part of a series of
cases in which the Antitrust Division has intervened, not to enforce the antitrust laws, but to oppose
enforcement where SEPs are concerned. For other examples, see Brief for the United States of
119
120
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Second, the Antitrust Division now takes the position that antitrust
should stop SSOs from trying to prevent SEP holdup. According to
Delrahim, “standard setting organizations should not become vehicles for
concerted actions by market participants to skew conditions for patented
technologies’ incorporation into a standard in favor of implementers because
this can reduce incentives to innovate and encourage patent hold-out.”125 He
further states that “because a key feature of patent rights is the right to
exclude, standard setting organizations and courts should have a very high
burden before they adopt rules that severely restrict that right or—even
worse—amount to a de facto compulsory licensing scheme.”126 He appears to
include a FRAND commitment in the list of things that face a “very
high burden.”127
These policies are a sharp reversal from the positions long taken by the
DOJ and the FTC, as well as the European Commission.128 Sadly, they rest
heavily on the deeply ﬂawed concept of patent holdout and on the specious
arguments dismissing patent holdup discussed above. By embracing the
patent holdout narrative and downplaying the dangers of patent holdup, the
Antitrust Division’s new policies risk undoing the progress courts and SSOs
have made in bringing SEP holdup under control.
C. A Limited Role for Antitrust in Promoting, Not Impeding, Competition
We favor an important but limited role for antitrust to control patent
holdup. One of the authors has previously expressed skepticism of broad
antitrust enforcement against patent holdup.129 But the critical point Lemley
made there is that, for the most part, we do not need antitrust if patent and
contract law eﬀectively enforce the private solutions SSOs have developed to
America as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party, HTC Corp. v. Telefonaktiebolaget LM
Ericsson, No. 19-40566 (5th Cir. Oct. 20, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/atr/casedocument/ﬁle/1214541/download [https://perma.cc/ZBL7-QCBA]; Statement of Interest of the
United States, Lenovo Inc. v. IPCOM GMBH & Co., No. 5:19-cv-01389-EJD (N.D. Cal. Oct. 25,
2019), https://www.justice.gov/atr/case-document/ﬁle/1213856/ download [https://perma.cc/LR6GZQH5].
125 Delrahim, “New Madison”, supra note 123, at 5.
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 See Case C-170/13, Huawei Techs. Co. vs. ZTE Corp., EU:C:2015:477 at 10-11 (July 16, 2015)
(requiring SEP owners to oﬀer FRAND licenses to alleged infringers willing to license); Eur.
Comm’n, Setting Out the EU Approach to Standard Essential Patents, at 6-7, COM (2017) 712 ﬁnal (Nov.
29, 2017), https://ec.europa.eu/docsroom/documents/26583 [https://perma.cc/6BUR-JREY]
(encouraging “FRAND licensing terms for SEPs” and setting forth comprehensive guidance for
such terms).
129 See Lemley, Ten Things, supra note 15, at 161 (arguing that antitrust law should “permit SSO
members the latitude to discuss royalty rates collectively before the standard is set” and “even allow
SSOs to impose a step-down royalty scheme”).
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the holdup problem.130 In his more temperate moments, Delrahim adds an
important caveat that, if taken seriously, might align him more with us:
“[A]ntitrust law should play no role in policing unilateral FRAND
commitments where contract or common law remedies would be adequate.”131
Unfortunately, he seemed to drop that caveat in the joint December 2019
statement with the PTO abandoning long-standing policy on FRAND
commitments. There, the Division and the PTO took the position that
patentees should be entitled to a full range of patent remedies, explicitly
including injunctions, even if they had committed to license the patents on FRAND
terms.132 As Herbert Hovenkamp has noted, the Justice Department’s position
contradicts established law on injunctive relief and FRAND.133
Even the more limited version of the statement is problematic. If courts
eﬀectively enforce FRAND commitments, most of the holdup problem can
be solved without resort to antitrust. But antitrust still has an important role
to play when contract law and anti-fraud laws fail to fully address the patent
holdup problem.134
The FTC’s case against Qualcomm provides a good example of why
antitrust is needed. In that case, the District Court found that Qualcomm had
breached its FRAND commitment and used its monopoly power over
modem chips to pressure its customers (Original Equipment Manufacturers,
or “OEMs”) to pay a royalty surcharge for Qualcomm’s SEPs on top of the
reasonable royalty rates that Qualcomm would otherwise have been able to
obtain. Qualcomm imposed this surcharge when Qualcomm’s customers
purchased modem chips from Qualcomm’s rivals.135 The District Court
correctly found that Qualcomm’s royalty surcharge acted like a tax when
Qualcomm’s customers purchased modem chips from Qualcomm’s rivals.136
Based on this reasoning, the District Court correctly found that Qualcomm’s
“no-license/no-chips” policy harmed competition by raising rivals’ costs and
Id.
Delrahim, “New Madison”, supra note 123, at 9 (emphasis added).
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE & NAT’L INST. OF
STANDARDS & TECH., supra note 120, at 4.
133 Herbert Hovenkamp, Justice Department’s New Position on Patents, Standard Setting, and
Injunctions, REG. REV. (Jan. 6, 2019), https://www.theregreview.org/2020/01/06/hovenkamp-justicedepartment-new-position-patents-standard-setting-injunctions/ [https://perma.cc/X66L-FFLF].
134 See Herbert Hovenkamp, FRAND and Antitrust, CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2020)
(manuscript at 1-2), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3420925 [https://perma.cc/
4G68-HK3S] (considering circumstances when antitrust enforcement is necessary and denouncing
the position that contract makes antitrust enforcement entirely unnecessary as “extreme”).
135 FTC v. Qualcomm Inc., 411 F. Supp. 3d 658, 698 (N.D. Cal. 2019).
136 See FTC v. Qualcomm, Inc., 935 F. 3d 752, 756 n.1 (“The theory . . . adopted by the district
court [was] that Qualcomm’s royalty rates operate as an exclusionary tax or surcharge on competitor
products.”). Shapiro’s trial testimony on behalf of the FTC emphasized this basic economics
concept.
130
131
132
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thereby excluding them, and that this same conduct also harmed Qualcomm’s
customers.137
The Ninth Circuit reversed, making basic errors of both economics and
law.138 On the economics, the Ninth Circuit mistakenly concluded that
“Qualcomm’s royalties are ‘chip-supplier neutral’ because Qualcomm collects
them from all OEMs that license its patents, not just ‘rival’s customers.’”139
This is ﬂatly incorrect, because the royalty surcharge reduces the gains from
trade between an OEM and a rival modem-chip supplier but does not reduce
the gains from trade between the OEM and Qualcomm.140 Based on this
error, the Ninth Circuit states incorrectly: “The FTC identiﬁes no such harm
to competition.”141
On the law, the Ninth Circuit rejects the well-established principle that
harming customers can be a way of harming competition: “[T]he primary
harms the district court identiﬁed here were to the OEMs who agree to pay
Qualcomm’s royalty rates—that is, Qualcomm’s customers, not its competitors.
These harms were thus located outside the ‘areas of eﬀective competition’—
the markets for CDMA and premium LTE modem chips.”142 The notion that
harms to customers in the relevant market are outside the scope of the
antitrust laws is simply bizarre.
In any event, as noted above, the District Court also found harm to
Qualcomm’s rivals in both of the relevant markets it identiﬁed. The Ninth
Circuit further erred by stating that “the district court’s ‘anticompetitive
surcharge’ theory fails to state a cogent theory of anticompetitive harm.”143
The Ninth Circuit’s logic at this point assumes that Qualcomm’s royalties
reﬂect the value of its SEPs, but that is directly contrary to the District
Court’s ﬁnding that Qualcomm used its monopoly over modem chips to
obtain a royalty surcharge, above and beyond the royalties Qualcomm could
obtain based on its SEPs.144 One cannot dismiss ﬁndings regarding the eﬀects
137 For a detailed discussion of Qualcomm’s eﬀorts, see FTC v. Qualcomm Inc., 411 F. Supp.
3d 658, 672-74, 814 (N.D. Cal. 2019).
138 FTC v. Qualcomm Inc., 969 F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 2020).
139 Id. at 996.
140 The Ninth Circuit also states: “Furthermore, competing chip suppliers are permitted to
practice Qualcomm’s SEPs freely without paying any royalties at all.” Id. at 997. The real economic
question is what fee Qualcomm extracts when an OEM purchases a modem chip from a Qualcomm
rival, not whether the OEM or the rival pays that fee. This too is a basic principle of taxation covered
in textbooks.
141 Id. at 996.
142 Id. at 999-1000.
143 Id. at 998.
144 Id. at 1000 (attempting to distinguish this case from Caldera Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F.
Supp. 2d 1244 (D. Utah 1999), where Microsoft was found to have violated the antitrust laws by
requiring OEMs to pay a royalty on every machine, whether or not it contained Microsoft’s
operating system).
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of a royalty surcharge by assuming away that very surcharge. Hopefully the
Supreme Court will correct these blatant errors.
Qualcomm’s use of its separate monopoly power over modem chips to
evade its FRAND commitment couldn’t be remedied in contract, making
antitrust enforcement a necessity for reasons beyond simply enforcing the
FRAND deal.145 In the standard-setting context, if a SEP owner breaches its
FRAND commitment and is thereby able to charge unreasonably high
royalties to device manufacturers, those royalties are likely to be passed
through in large part to ﬁnal consumers. Antitrust enforcement can protect
consumers from these overcharges.146
But to the extent that antitrust can step back in some settings, that is only
possible because the market participants have recognized and responded
effectively to the patent holdup problem by requiring reasonable licensing
terms, and because the courts have enforced that requirement in contract or
patent law. The second prong of the Antitrust Division’s attack on FRAND
commitments therefore undermines whatever merit there might be to the first
prong. While on the one hand Delrahim says that we don’t need antitrust
because contract and equity will solve the patent holdup problem, on the other
hand he is advocating policies that make it harder for contract and patent law
to solve that very problem. Threatening SSOs with liability—maybe even per
se liability—for trying to stop SEP holdup undermines the very contractual
solution on which Delrahim purports to rely. So too do Delrahim’s periodic
claims that holdup is a good thing, or at least something we should accept,147
145 For a discussion of the importance of the FRAND commitment to the FTC’s case against
Qualcomm, see Erik Hovenkamp & Timothy Simcoe, Tying and Exclusion in FRAND Licensing:
Evaluating Qualcomm, ANTITRUST SOURCE (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 6-12),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3523797 [https://perma.cc/S2PZ-BETY].
146 See Joseph Farrell, John Hayes, Carl Shapiro & Theresa Sullivan, Standard Setting, Patents,
and Hold-Up, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 603, 608-09 (“[D]ownstream consumers are harmed when
excessive royalties are passed on to them . . . . This is . . . an antitrust problem.”). Werden and Froeb
argue that antitrust can do nothing about misrepresentations and failure to abide by FRAND
commitments because those don’t attack the process of competition itself. Gregory J. Werden &
Luke M. Froeb, Why Patent Hold-Up Does Not Violate Antitrust Law, 27 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1,
2, 21, 26 (2019). But they confuse complaints about holdup in the abstract with challenges to
misrepresentations and other behavior by a monopolist designed to avoid a commitment to
permitting competition. See Jorge L. Contreras, Much Ado About Hold-Up, 2019 U. ILL. L. REV. 875,
875 (2019) (“Patent hold-up is a form of market behavior, not a legal cause of action . . . . To the
extent that hold-up behavior constitutes an abuse of market power, with resulting harms to
competition, longstanding doctrines of antitrust and competition law exist to sanction it.”).
Anticompetitive conduct by companies like Qualcomm designed to avoid or evade a FRAND
commitment can violate the antitrust laws, just as fraud and other conduct—even conduct not itself
illegal—can be the anticompetitive conduct necessary for any other sort of monopolization claim.
See, e.g., Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297 (3d Cir. 2007); FTC v. Qualcomm Inc.,
411 F. Supp. 3d 658 (N.D. Cal. 2019).
147 Delrahim, “New Madison”, supra note 122, at 8 (“Stating that a patent holder can derive
higher licensing fees through hold-up simply reﬂects basic commercial reality.”).
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his incorrect claim that patent holdout is a bigger problem than patent
holdup,148 and his advocacy for undoing or avoiding eBay and giving a patent
owner the right to an automatic injunction.149 Indeed, under Delrahim, the
Antitrust Division evidently objects even to voluntary commitments by patent
owners not to seek an injunction as part of the standard-setting process.150
Ironically, this assault on SSOs and FRAND policies may actually necessitate
more antitrust intervention in standard-setting. If the DOJ encourages
companies like Qualcomm to ignore their FRAND commitments, and if the
DOJ discourages SSOs from trying to solve the SEP holdup problem, or
impedes their efforts to do so, antitrust may ultimately have to step in to
protect a functioning market from SEP holdup.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The theory of holdup is well-supported by a substantial body of empirical
evidence. For valid conceptual and practical reasons, this empirical literature has
not involved showing that large-scale actual holdups are common. Rather, the
evidence generally comes in the form of efforts by private parties to contract
around holdup. The same types of evidence and the same standards regarding
empirical work should be applied when testing the theory of patent holdup.
When such standards are applied, it is clear that the problem of patent
holdup is substantial. Indeed, patent holdup, and especially SEP holdup, are
very difficult strains of holdup to manage. Furthermore, the problem of patent
holdup is quite common, since it arises whenever the efficient development of
new products and services involves substantial investments that may turn out
to be specific to another party’s patent portfolio. Not surprisingly, therefore,
virtually all players in the high-tech industries affected by holdup participate
in voluntary organizations where they agree to limit everyone’s rights
(including their own) in an effort to pre-commit to avoid holdup.
Both the theory and the empirical work relating to patent holdup indicate
that market participants have strong incentives to devise institutions to limit
patent holdup. Considerable progress was made between 2006 and 2016 in
controlling patent holdup in the United States, primarily through the courts,
but also through competition policy enforcement. Unfortunately, some of
148 See id. at 10 (“[I]mplementer hold-out poses a more serious threat to innovation than
innovator hold-up.”).
149 See U.S. Dept. of Just., supra note 120, at 12-14 (arguing that the injunction rights of patent
holders should be “[p]rotected, not [p]ersecuted”); cf. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. PATENT &
TRADEMARK OFFICE & NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH., supra note 120, at 5 (“[T]he
remedies that may apply in a given patent case include injunctive relief . . . .”); Delrahim, supra note
97, at 6 n.14 (seeming to acknowledge the wisdom of eBay but in the same breath giving the ITC
free rein to ignore it and impose automatic injunctions).
150 Letter from Makan Delrahim to Sophia A. Muirhead, supra note 121.
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that progress is now at risk due to a drastic shift in policy at the Antitrust
Division of the Department of Justice. That shift is based on faulty
economics, relies on ﬂawed arguments, and is contrary to both patent law and
the empirical evidence.
Rather than go backward, more forward progress is needed to manage and
control patent holdup in general and SEP holdup in particular.
• The costs caused by the problem of SEP holdup can be reduced if
more SSOs follow the lead of the IEEE by clarifying and
strengthening their patent policies. The SEP policies of many SSOs
are certainly valuable, but eﬀorts by Qualcomm and others to ignore
or game their FRAND commitments show the necessity of SSOs
being more explicit about just what their FRAND commitments
entail.
• The costs of SEP holdup can be reduced if the ITC joins the policy
mainstream by recognizing that exclusion orders based on FRANDencumbered SEPs are normally not in the public interest, provided
the SEP owner has another available legal venue through which it
can secure reasonable royalties. The White House reined in the ITC
in 2013 when it sought to grant exclusion orders despite the
patentee’s commitment to license the patents. The ITC should
aﬃrmatively apply that policy.
• Most importantly, the courts should enforce reasonable SSO policies
that target SEP holdup. Courts have been doing this as a matter of
contract law, but patent owners seeking to engage in holdup have
strong incentives to ignore or ﬁnd ways to undermine, avoid, or
evade their FRAND obligations. When they do so, antitrust must be
willing to step in to protect competition and consumers by stopping
patent holdup.

